Five key developments in international relations this week: 24-28 July 🔍🌍

SITREP : Sudan conflict

Now well past the 100-day mark, the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues unabated with no clear end in sight. While the tri-city metropolitan area of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman remains the epicentre of the war, as previously mentioned, additional conflict zones are taking shape in parts of the Darfur region (across various localities in West Darfur, South Darfur and North Darfur states), and in North Kordofan and Northern states. Apart from the politico-military disputes which have been at the core of the conflict, the expanding violence has drawn in an explosive mix of inter-communal tensions and ethnic alliances which could potentially exacerbate conflict dynamics and tip the fighting into a fully-fledged civil war.

With respect to battlefield dynamics, the RSF seems to have made some gains in recent weeks, especially in areas around the capital where it has reportedly besieged the  headquarters of the SAF, trapping army leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and several other senior military commanders. Despite this, the RSF’s military superiority is far from certain and the momentum could swing in the SAF’s favour in the coming days or weeks, especially if the army is able to establish alternative supply lines or retake territory in the proximity of its General Command. Nevertheless, the precarious position that the SAF finds itself may edge it towards the negotiating table. For its part, the RSF is faced with a narrow base of support and growing hostility from the population as a result of its commission of atrocities and widespread human rights abuses.

On the mediation front, as reported last week, there was an attempt to revive peace talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which saw the participation of representatives from both conflict parties. In a similar vein, Egypt, which is a key ally of the SAF, also launched a mediation initiative on 12 July that brought together leaders of Sudan’s neighbouring states, including Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, as well as the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the African Union Commission (AUC) chairperson. This week, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC; a coalition of pro-democracy political and civilian groupings in Sudan) met in Cairo, Egypt on 25 July to discuss options for ending the war. At the end of their meeting on 26 July, the FFC issued a statement which called for “a regional and international mechanism that preserves Sudan’s sovereignty and works on the cessation of negative external interference.” The FFC statement also urged the establishment of a transitional government that would take the necessary steps to restore civilian and democratic rule, underpinned by a national dialogue and implementation of transitional justice measures. Going forward, the prospects of a negotiated settlement remain contingent on not only the realisation of a mutually hurting stalemate that will spur a reconsideration away from the military option, but also on coordination among the various mediators and their respective initiatives.

Casualty figures, as of 26 July: As per the latest reports by Sudanese health authorities, since the start of the war at least 705 people  have been killed; 5,287 injured and more than 3.5 million people displaced (according to reports by various humanitarian agencies).

Tunisia: protests to mark two years since President Saied’s power grab

Protests took place in Tunis on 25 July as the country marked two years since President Kais Saied seized full power in 2021 when he suspended parliament, dismissed the prime minister and effectively consolidated one-man rule while imbuing the presidency with absolute powers. Since his power grab, Saied has cemented his autocratic regime through constitutional reform, paired with political repression manifest in the arrest and detention of political opponents including opposition party leaders, civil society advocates, businessmen, judges, and media personalities.

The latest protests are part of demonstrations that have been ongoing since 2021, organised at various times by civil society and political groupings such as the main opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front, as well as by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT). While the grievances against Saied’s dictatorial rule have been the rallying call among civil society and various opposition parties, the broader protest campaign has been weakened by ideological and political differences among the individual stakeholders which have hampered the formation of unified front against Saied’s regime.

Meanwhile, Tunisia’s current political quagmire is compounded by prevailing economic challenges in the form of a weakening currency, decades-high inflation rate (10.4% in February 2023), widening fiscal deficits, and rising poverty and unemployment rates. These economic troubles motivated the government to launch negotiations in October 2022 with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for US$1.9 billion assistance package. Despite an agreement in principle on the loan, talks with the IMF have been stalled for months after Saied rejected the IMF’s demand for broader reforms, which included the restructuring of state-owned firms, lifting of subsidies, and freezing of public sector wages.

Overall, deteriorating socio-economic conditions, coupled with the deepening sentiment against Saied’s autocratic rule will continue to serve as catalysts for protest activity and social unrest in the short- to medium term.

Sources: Al Jazeera, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Niger: another coup d’état

Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum was removed from office in a coup d’etat on 26 July. As per updates on 27 July, a group of military officers, represented by Colonel Amadou Abdramane, appeared on television late on 26 July to announce Bazoum’s ouster, as well as the dissolution of the constitution, suspension of all institutions and closure of the country’s borders. Earlier on the same day, members of the Presidential Guard, blocked off access to the presidential complex, sparking a defiant tweet by the Presidency and a warning that the army was ready to attack the coup plotters should they refuse to back down. It was not immediately clear if indeed a coup had taken place although the situation seemed to evolve rather rapidly leading up to the announcement by army leaders on 27 July. As things stand, it seems that Niger is witnessing its fifth coup since independence, and the sixth of such coups across the West African region since 2020.

The coup organizers have pointed to economic challenges, poor governance and the deteriorating security situation amidst ongoing jihadist violence broadly across the Sahel, and closer to home in Niger’s Tillabéri region, located near its border with Mali and Burkina Faso. The military takeover has drawn condemnation from regional and international stakeholders, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the United Nations, and Niger’s western security partners – France, the US and the European Union.

The latest development adds to the worrisome pattern of coups in West Africa, raising alarm about the regression of democracy in the region and the deepening of political and economic instability. Academic research points to several drivers of coups including: governance failures, corruption, failure by authorities to provide security to the population amidst proliferating jihadist violence, and deteriorating socio-economic conditions aggravated by inflationary pressures and slowdown in the global economy. The coup could also imperil the efforts against violent extremism in the Sahel, particularly in light of the pivotal role that Niger has played as a hub for Western countries providing security assistance as part of counterterrorism operations. For instance, in 2022, Niger became the new base for some 1,000 French soldiers who had been redeployed from neighbouring Mali. Niger is also an integral part of the US’ Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership and has received more than US$500 million in military assistance equipment and training programs since 2012.

Source: AyishaOsori on Twitter

2^nd Russia-Africa summit, 27-28 July

The second Russia-Africa summit  is taking place in St Petersburg from 27-28 July. The event brought together leaders from African nations and various stakeholders from business, private sector, academia and civil society. The stated goal of the summit was “to promote efforts to strengthen comprehensive and equal cooperation between Russia and African nations across all areas of society including politics, security, economic relations, science and technology, and the cultural and humanitarian spheres.” The Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum is also running parallel to the summit, providing a platform for discussions on a range of themes such as cooperation in science and technology, partnership for food sovereignty, the new global economy and cooperation in the humanitarian and social spheres, among others.

At the time of publication, the summit was in its second day and was marked by a smaller attendance than expected with only 17 heads of states participating as part of the 49 African delegations comprised of senior government officials and representatives. The issue of food security, especially grain exports to Africa amidst supply disruptions as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, and Russia’s security activities in Africa were major topics of discussions. Acknowledging these priority issues, Russian President Putin penned an article prior to the summit on 24 July in which he highlighted stability, trust and goodwill as principles informing Russia-Africa cooperation over the years. He also asserted Russia’s “respect for the sovereignty of African states, their traditions and values, their desire to independently determine their own destiny and freely build relationships with partners.” On the issue of grain exports, coming on the back of Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal on 17 July, Putin gave the assurance that Russia was “able to substitute Ukrainian grain both on a commercial basis and in the form of free aid to the neediest countries in Africa.” This was followed by a pledge at the summit for the delivery of 25,000-50,000 tons of grain free of charge to six African countries in the next three to four months.

For Moscow, the summit presented an opportunity to deepen trade and investment ties with the African continent, where Russia lags behind other strategic partners such as China, the European Union and the US. In 2021, Russia’s trade in the continent was worth $15.6 billion, exporting seven times as much as it imports from Africa. Russia also accounts for a small proportion of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Africa – estimated to be less than 1% of Africa's total stock of FDI in 2019. Nevertheless, over the past two decades, Russia’s economic engagement with the continent has broadened across a range of sectors including advanced technologies, energy, agriculture, health and education.

Source : EIU

It is perhaps the security sector in which Russia’s footprint on the continent has been most visible through avenues such as arms exports (Russia is the leading supplier of arms to Africa), as well as the activities of the Wagner group which has increasingly emerged as the most influential form of Russian engagement in Africa. A private military company with close links to the Kremlin, the Wagner group has advanced a model centred around strategic activities across the military, political and economic spheres. These include providing support to autocratic governments seeking support in fighting insurgencies or rebel groups, running political influence and disinformation campaigns, and engaging in commercial activities by securing access to resources such as mining interests in exchange for security services.

Broadly, the summit also presented a platform for Russia to advance its efforts in courting Africa’s diplomatic support in the context of the fallout of the Russia-Ukraine war. Part of this has been deepening fragmentation of the global economic and international order centred around the geopolitical stand-off between Russia and the collective West. In this regard, Russia will be keen on driving home the message that a multipolar world order is taking shape, of which it is an integral part. Moreover, Africa’s geostrategic relevance as a constitutive actor in global politics can be highlighted as one of the major takeaways of the Russia-Africa summit.

China: shake-up at the foreign ministry

China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC) announced on 25 July the removal of Qin Gang as foreign minister and his replacement by Wang Yi. Wang, who is a Politburo member, previously served as foreign minister from 2013-2022 before being appointed as director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission Office since January this year.

The reasons for Qin’s dismissal were not revealed although there has been plenty of rumours and speculation. Some theories are that he was the victim of internal power struggles, that he may have been involved in corruption, or that he caught out for engaging in an illicit romantic relationship.  Prior to his dismissal, Qin had disappeared from public view for the past month and was markedly absent at the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia earlier this month.

At the time of the announcement, Wang was attending a meeting of BRICS National Security Advisers and High Representatives on National Security in Johannesburg, South Africa from July 24 to 25. He also visited Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Turkey. Broadly, the latest development attests to the opacity in China’s system of government and a strictly enforced code of conduct within party structures, with little tolerance for indiscipline or corruption. The changes at the foreign ministry are not expected to have any significant impact of the trajectory of Beijing’s contemporary foreign policy, which is largely informed by the tenets of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.