Five key developments in international relations this week: 17-21 July 🔍🌍

SITREP: Sudan conflict

As the war in Sudan entered its fourth month, air and artillery strikes permeated Khartoum and the neighbouring cities of Omdurman and Bahri as the main belligerents, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) both sought to gain the upper hand militarily. According to local reports, the bombardment persists throughout the daytime, adding to a rapidly growing casualty numbers.

Elsewhere, in the town of Kass, located in South Darfur state, at least three civilians were killed and dozens injured in clashes between the SAF and RSF on 16 July. The RSF later announced their full control of the command of the 61st Infantry Brigade in the town, in addition to the seizure of 13  fully-loaded combat vehicles and various types of weaponry, as well as the capture of 30 soldiers of various ranks.

As the fighting continued in various localities, there was an attempt to revive peace talks, as per reports of the arrival of representatives of both the SAF and RSF in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 16 July. Previous talks in Jeddah facilitated by Saudi Arabia and the United States were suspended by both countries in early June after numerous cease-fire violations. This comes on the back of a mediation attempt launched by Egypt last week, including all of Sudan’s neighbours.

The revival of talks, paired with more coordination among the stakeholders – the Saudi-US initiative, the IGAD Quartet and the Egypt-led peace initiative – build on renewed hope of the likely chance of a negotiated settlement in the coming weks or months. In recent days, high-level officials of the SAF and RSF have also indicated a willingness to negotiate.

EU-CELAC summit, 17-18 July

The third EU-CELAC Summit of Heads of State and Government was held in Brussels, Belgium on 17 and 18 July 2023. The summit, the first in eight years, brought together 60 leaders from the two regional blocs, culminating in a declaration which covered issues of mutual interest including the need to strengthen the multilateral system, respect for human rights and climate action, among others.

During the summit, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen presented the EU-LAC Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA), a €45 billion package to support investment in over 130 projects in Latin America and the Caribbean until 2027, in key sectors such as  the green transition, an inclusive digital transformation, human development and health resilience. In addition, the EU also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Argentina for the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as renewable energy and hydrogen. A similar energy cooperation was also signed with Uruguay on renewable energy, energy efficiency and green hydrogen. Furthermore, as part of the EU’s drive to diversify its supply chains, especially relating to critical raw materials, the EU signed an MoU with Chile on establishing a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials value chains. This strategic partnership aims to capitalise on Chile’s profile as a leading producer of key critical raw materials, including copper and lithium, which are essential to Europe’s green and digital transitions.

Despite the promises of investment deals and deepening of cooperation between the two regions, the summit was clouded by divergences, especially relating to the Russia-Ukraine war. As per reports, disagreements relating to the final summit communiqué persisted until the last hour with contentions on whether language in the text should refer to the war “against Ukraine,"  or "in Ukraine." In the end, the declaration opted for “war against Ukraine” without specifically mentioning Russia. The tensions that surfaced during the summit were already evident in the preceding weeks with CELAC member states pushing back against an initial draft sent by the EU in June which contained several paragraphs sharply condemning Russia for its intervention in the Ukraine war. In response, CELAC reportedly sent back a counter-proposal that deleted everything about Ukraine, in addition to turning down the EU’s invitation to Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelensky to the summit. For the CELAC countries, their objections were intended to prevent the summit from transforming into yet another battleground for advancement of the EU’s own geopolitical ambitions rather than focusing on interregional matters.

Disagreements also spilled over into the nature of trade relationships with CELAC member states decrying what they perceived as an extension of the paternalism that has characterised relations between the two regions, informed by the history of colonialism and exploitation that has largely benefited Europe over the years. Affirming the impetus from Latin American and Caribbean countries and the broader Global South to be treated as equal partners in relations with the West, Argentina’s President Albert Fernández recently asserted that “No one” can “doom” Latin American countries “to being suppliers of raw materials, that others process industrially, to then “sell us the over-priced products.” n

Relatedly, little headway was also made in negotiations to finalise the stalled EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement which has been held off since 2019 as a result of differences over a number of issues, most notably, concerns regarding deforestation in the Amazon and French farmers’ fear of competition from Brazilian beef. A few weeks before the summit, Mercosur countries cancelled trade talks with the EU’s inclusion of social and environmental clauses, a move which could potentially see EU companies gaining greater access to public state contracts. Brazil, the current president of Mercosur, has promised to deliver a counter-proposal in the coming weeks, although a breakthrough in the negotiations in the near-term is highly unlikely.

EU-Tunisia migration deal

Tunisia and the European Union signed on 16 July a €1 billion strategic partnership agreement that included a deal to curb the flow of migrants entering Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Apart from migration, the deal also included four non-migration pillars, namely, a € 10 million education package in scholarships and exchange programmes for Tunisian students, additional investment and trade opportunities in various sectors, and a boost for Tunisia’s renewable energy sector.

Earlier in June, the EU provided €150 million in budget support and made a pledge of €900 million package to support Tunisia’s economy, contingent on approval of a loan from the IMF. With its economy in the doldrums, Tunisia is in need of economic assistance packages. The country’s grim macro-economic outlook has persisted under President Kais Saied’s increasingly autocratic regime as the ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine war have exacerbated an economic crisis characterised by rising inflation, widening fiscal deficits and a hight debt-to-GDP ratio close to 90%. In 2021, Saied suspended the Tunisian National Assembly and dismissed the government, and has gone on to rule by decree. Amidst worsening soci-economic conditions, talks with the IMF for a $1,9 billion assistance package that began in October 2022 stalled after Saied rejected the IMF’s demand for broader reforms. In his most recent remarks on the deal in April, Saied said that he would not accept “diktats from abroad” and that Tunisians had to rely on themselves.

The deteriorating economic and political situation in Tunisia has raised concerns in Europe with leaders fearing an influx of migrants if the instability persists. This comes amid a notable surge in migrant arrivals in the first three months of this year. According to Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency,  the Central Mediterranean route saw nearly 28,000 irregular border crossings between January and March 2023, accounting for more than half of all irregular border crossings into the EU. In the latest deal, the EU has earmarked €100 million for the tightening of border controls, anti-smuggling operations, search and rescue operations, and migrant returns to Tunisia. The partnership is modelled on the €6 billion ‘cash for migrant control’ pact which has been in place between the EU and Turkey since 2016. There are reports that plans are in place for similar agreements with Egypt and Morocco.

Overall, the deal has drawn condemnation from rights groups who argue that such a securitized approach to migration, with no consideration of complex push and pull factors at play, would have the opposite effect of driving more migrants to taking the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean with the risk of death or falling prey to smuggling and human trafficking networks. The deal has also cast a shadow on EU’s purported claim to respect human rights and democratic values while getting into a partnership with a leader who is actively curtailing the political and civil liberties of his own citizens. Furthermore, the deal could also lead to increased racial violence and atrocities against migrants in Tunisia, adding onto the recent spate of attacks in recent weeks against sub-Saharan migrants living in the country, motivated by Saied’s comments that undocumented migrants were a demographic threat.

Russia suspends its participation in Black Sea Grain deal

Russia announced on 17 July that it was suspending its participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative which had allowed shipments out of Ukrainian ports for nearly a year. The deal, which was brokered by the United Nations and Turkey in July 2022 allowed for the exports of grain, other foodstuff and fertilizer from Ukrainian ports of Yuzhny, Odesa and Chornomorsk to global markets. Since then, the deal was renewed for multiple short increments and was up for renewal on 17 July when Russia suspended its participation.

Per Russian authorities, the decision to withdraw from the deal was motivated by the non-implementation of a part of the agreement which entailed the lifting of sanction restrictions on Russian food and fertilizer exports, the reconnection of Russia's agriculture-focused Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT payment system, resumption of the Tolyatti-Odessa ammonia pipeline and unblocking the frozen assets of Russian companies linked with the transportation of food and fertilizers.

At the time of its commencement, the main objectives of the Black Sea grain deal were to aid in lowering global food prices, which had been driven up by disruptions to production and supply chains as a result of the war, and to ensure delivery of food supplies to the most vulnerable countries. Russia and Ukraine are significant producers and exporters of several commodities including wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and fertilizers. Russia is the world’s top wheat exporter and Ukraine was the fifth largest, prior to the outbreak of the war. According to the UN, combined, the two countries account for as much of 19 percent of global barley supply, 14 percent of wheat supply and 4 percent of corn supply. As per the UN’s latest report in July, under the Black Sea grain deal, more than 32 million tonnes of food commodities have been exported from three Ukrainian Black Sea ports to 45 countries across three continents.

While the positive aspects of the Black Sea Grain deal are commendable particularly with regard to easing prices on the global food market, there has been criticism from some quarters about the deal benefiting high-income and middle-income countries more that the least developed countries. The top five recipients of the grain exports under the deal were China, Spain, Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands. Other estimates suggest that nearly 70% of exports consisted of livestock feed corn and fodder crops delivered to markets in the EU.

The termination of the agreement initially had a negligible impact on commodity markets. Chicago Board of Trade wheat futures jumped shortly after the announcement but fell to lower levels than what was recorded at close of day on 14 July. With Russia’s withdrawal on the cards for some months prior, potential price shocks were offset by ample supplies underpinned by bumper wheat crops in Russia and Australia, a strong corn harvest in Brazil, as well as alternative shipping routes.

Overall, the biggest impact of the termination of the Black Sea will be felt in Ukraine. The collapse of the deal will see Ukraine lose of a significant share of its export capacity on the global grains market as importers compensate from alternative sources. Furthermore, high cost of transport overland via the EU’s so-called solidarity lanes as well as competition from other Eastern European markets could lead to lower prices for Ukraine’s producers, which in turn could negatively impact maize and wheat production for 2024.

US-China relations

US climate envoy John Kerry’s visit to China

US climate envoy, John Kerry visited Beijing, China for a four-day visit from 16-19 July. The meetings with his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, were centred around issues such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, limiting coal use, climate financing as well as promoting a successful COP28 set to take place in November in Dubai.  Kerry’s visit is the latest in a series of visits by high-level US officials to China in recent months, following Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip in June and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen‘s visit earlier this month.

The US-China relationship has been blighted by tensions over a range of issues including spying allegations, Taiwan, bans on exports of advanced technologies, and trade tariffs. The talks did not result in any major outcomes although the two sides agreed that climate change remained a major issue on the global agenda.

In a notable development relating to US-China relations, former US National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, undertook a visit to Beijing on 20 July. Kissinger was reportedly given a grand welcome befitting a head of state  and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping and several other high-ranking Chinese officials including Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee Wang Yi and Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu. The feting of Kissinger has largely been viewed as an homage to the pivotal role he played in the normalisation of US-China relations in the 1970s, culminating in his and former President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972. Broadly, Kissinger’s latest visit has been welcomed as a positive sign that there remains vestiges of hope in attempts to salvage the relationship between the two great powers, particularly during an era characterised by strategic competition and zero-sum approach towards bilateral relations.