Five key developments in international relations this week: 14 – 18 Aug 🔍🌍

SITREP : Sudan conflict

The security situation and humanitarian crisis as a result of the conflict in Sudan continues to deteriorate since its eruption on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). According to latest UN figures, at least 4,000 people have been killed as a result of the war and over 1 million forced to flee to neighbouring countries. There have also been reports of sexual violence against women and girls with rights groups documenting at least 32 incidents of sexual violence against 73 victims by 02 August. The picture is equally grim on the humanitarian front – more than 6 million people in Sudan are one step away from famine, in addition to acute shortage of medical supplies.

On the battlefield, majority of confrontations between the warring factions remained centred around the capital Khartoum and the neighbouring cities of Bahri and Omdurman. However, as previously highlighted, fighting has expanded to parts of the Darfur region (across various localities in West Darfur, South Darfur and North Darfur states), and in North Kordofan and Northern states. In the latest flare-up of violence in Nyala, South Darfur state, at least 43 people were killed and hundreds injured in fighting over several days between the SAF and RSF, according to reports on 15 August. Separately, at least two people were killed on 12 August in the town of Dalami, South Kordofan state following an attack by the El Hilu faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N El Hilu; a rebel force based in South Kordofan and Blue Nile region) against SAF forces.

Various peace efforts to negotiate a ceasefire in the conflict have stalled; there have been at least nine cease-fire agreements between the warring parties, brokered largely by Washington and Riyadh during May and June but all have failed to take a hold.

LIBYA: Clashes between armed groups in Tripoli

At least 55 people were killed and 146 others injured in clashes between two rival armed groups on 14 August in several neighbourhoods in the south of the capital, Tripoli. The fighting, which abated by 16 August was triggered by the detention of the 444 Brigade head, Colonel Mahmud Hamza, by the rival Special Deterrence Force (SDF) as he was in transit at Tripoli’s Mitiga Airport. According to local reports, fighting ceased after an agreement was reached for the release of Hamza to a neutral party. Both of these armed groups are considered dominant military forces in the capital; the 444 Brigade is reportedly affiliated with the interior ministry while the SDF occasionally functions as a police force in the capital.

Armed groups in Libya often engage in violent clashes overt territory and ideological divergences. These armed groups have also gained significant influence in the country’s political landscape against the backdrop of prolonged political uncertainty and instability characterised by long-running power struggle between rival governing entities − namely, the Government of National Unity (GNU) led by internationally recognised prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the Government of National Stability (GNS) led by parliament-appointed prime minister Osama Hamada.

Given the prevailing post-revolutionary dynamics which have seen formation of alliances between the rival government authorities and various armed groups, such clashes between these forces, characterised by indiscriminate violence including against civilians, are likely to persist. In addition to aggravating the already tenuous security situation, the interlinked political and security dynamics could exacerbate the enduring impasse between the rival governments, further prolonging uncertainty over holding of delayed elections that were scheduled to take place in December 2021.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – MONUSCO’s wind-down on course

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has said that the organization’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC – the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – is entering its “final phase,” amid ongoing processes for its withdrawal scheduled for December this year. This was reflected in the Secretary-General’s report to the UN Security Council published on 02 August.

The UN has had a peacekeeping presence in the DRC since 1999 leading up to the transition from its previous mission (MONUC) to MONUSCO in 2010. Apart from the name change including the focus on stabilization, MONUSCO’s mandate was updated to include the use of force to contain aggressors ( myriad armed groups and militias challenging state authority), to protect civilians, and to support the Government of the DRC in its efforts to stabilize and consolidate peace.

MONUSCO’s drawdown takes place against the backdrop of a tenuous security situation in eastern DRC which has seen a resurgence of the M23 armed group in late 2021, accompanied by an uptick in violence and the capture of large swathes of  territories in North Kivu province, namely Rutshuru, Masisi and Nyiragongo. The latest round of violence prompted the Congolese authorities to seek support from regional bloc, the East African Community (EAC), which resulted in the deployment of a regional force (comprised of troops from Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda ) in April 2022 with a mandate contain, defeat and eradicate negative forces in eastern DRC. As per the latest reports by the UN in June, the EAC regional force had recaptured some key areas previously occupied by the M23, although the armed group maintains an operational presence in North Kivu.

The fragile political and security environment in eastern DRC, characterised by massive displacement and violence against civilians, has also fostered a legitimacy crisis and mistrust of MONUSCO and any foreign military presence by a wary public. The popular discontent has played out as protests against MONUSCO, most recently in July 2022 which saw demonstrators targeting MONUSCO personnel and premises. A core concern by protesters is the perceived failure of the mission to curb the spiralling violence in the country and adequately protect civilians despite its presence for over two decades.

Despite the sustained pressure for an accelerated withdrawal of MONUSCO, there is growing concern that a rushed transition process could exacerbate the security situation in the eastern region, possibly leaving a vacuum that could allow armed groups and militias to entrench their control over key areas. Meanwhile as the country heads towards elections in December 2023, there are warning signs of renewed violence amid heightened tensions and allegations of a lack of transparency and irregularities in the voter registration process. Broadly, these developments reinforce the grim outlook for the DRC’s political stability and security, underpinned by complex drivers and factors that continue to fuel multi-dimensional conflict and volatility.

NIGER: aftermath of the coup

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) met on 14 August to discuss the situation in Niger, following the 26 July coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum. The outcomes from this meeting are yet to be made public. The PSC meeting came after the junta announced on 13 August  that it intended to prosecute Bazoum on charges of “high treason and undermining the internal and external security” of the country. There has been a flurry of diplomatic efforts aimed at realizing a return to civilian rule in Niger, including a series of contact meetings by eminent persons from neighbouring Nigeria. In this regard, a group of Nigerian Islamic scholars who visited Niamey on 13 August reported that the junta was open to diplomacy and dialogue in resolving the standoff with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with reference to developments in the aftermath of the coup.

ECOWAS has maintained the option of a military intervention as a last resort to restore a civilian government in Niger despite opposition from various quarters to such a move. The latest round of meetings saw ECOWAS defence chiefs convene in Accra, Ghana on 17 August to discuss possible military intervention, which has so far been advanced as the activation of the regional standby force. Although the relevant frameworks pertinent to such a force exist in theory, its deployment is unlikely not only due to capacity constraints, but also given the glaring lack of consensus among ECOWAS member states. Burkina Faso and Mali, both under military governments, have warned that any use of force by the regional bloc would be tantamount to a declaration of war. Guinea, which is also under a junta, has yet to declare whether it would join Mali and Burkina Faso although it has condemned external military aggression.

The spectre of a military intervention, with potentially destabilising effects across the region, has also divided the AU and ECOWAS. According to several sources cited by French media, the AU is opposed to any military intervention by ECOWAS. Furthermore, several countries across Africa have voiced their objection to use of force in resolving the Niger crisis. Meanwhile supporters of the junta in Niger have reportedly formed a new militant group and has called for mass mobilisation of citizens against the threat of an ECOWAS-led military intervention.

Overall, the latest developments point to a hardening of stances of both ECOWAS and the Nigerien military leadership, pointing to the difficult road towards a resolution of the crisis. Against this backdrop, the threat of jihadist violence in Niger and the Sahel region persists with significant repercussions for broader peace and security. On 15 August, Niger’s defence ministry reported that at least 17 of its soldiers were killed and 20 others wounded during an attack near the town of Koutougou, which is located near the country’s  borders with Mali and Burkina Faso.

Gabon finalises debt-for nature deal

Gabon on 15 August finalised continental Africa’s first-ever debt-for-nature swap in a deal that will allow it to refinance its debt in exchange for marine conservation activities and a clampdown on illegal fishing. The $500 million deal, which was facilitated by the Bank of America, will see a restructuring of Gabon’s debt, giving it more time to make repayments. In exchange, the country has promised to contribute $125 million towards ocean conservation and  upgrading fishing regulations. According to US International Development Finance Corporation, the Gabon Blue Bond will generate an expected $163 million in financing.

Debt-for-nature swaps entail indebted developing nations seeking assistance from developed world financial institutions to pay off their debt in exchange for conservation efforts. The latest deal with Gabon is the fourth of the so-called “blue bonds” advanced by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) as part of its efforts to promote marine conservation. The TNC has previously concluded similar Blue Bonds projects with Seychelles, Belize, and Barbados. The initiative also builds on Gabon’s government-led ‘Gabon Bleu’ project, announced in 2013, which expanded the country’s marine protected areas and made it the first central African nation to establish a marine protected area network. Looking ahead, the deal is also expected to meet the country’s commitment to protect 30 percent of its lands, freshwater systems, and ocean by 2030.

Despite the highlights of the deal and its potential as an innovative financial mechanism, there exist downside risks in the context of Gabon’s economic profile, namely the country’s vulnerable liquidity and fiscal position due to oil price fluctuations and high credit risks due to substantial arrears owed to external creditors. Nevertheless, the debt-for-nature swaps represent a significant innovation in debt financing, in addition to the alignment with environmental action and national and international commitments to scale up ocean conservation around the world and protect diverse ecosystems.