Five key developments in international relations this week: 07 -11 August 🔍🌍

SITREP: Sudan conflict

Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued in the tri-city metropolitan area of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman as the former escalated its efforts to regain control of the capital. The immediate goal of the SAF in recent days has been the capture of the Shambat bridge – linking Omdurman and Khartoum North, which has served as a strategic point for the RSF’s supply line sin Khartoum and the surrounding areas.

The battle for territorial dominance, involving aerial bombardment and heavy shelling has ramped up the casualty toll, with estimations of over 3900 fatalities since the onset of the war in mid-April. In the latest round of fighting, at least 33 civilians were killed in Omdurman  over three days since 07 August, as per local reports. Additionally, there were reports of clashes between the warring factions in Nyala, South Darfur state, which resulted in dozens of fatalities, displacement of hundreds of civilians, and widespread destruction of buildings and critical infrastructure. Parallel to the fighting between the military factions, there has been an uptick in inter-communal violence in the Darfur region between Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups, fuelling concerns of escalating violence along ethnic lines.

Separately, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has denied reports in the media accusing it of supplying weapons and ammunition to the RSF. This comes after US media outlet  Wall Street Journal published an article on 10 August claiming weapons had been discovered on an Emirati aid flight to Sudanese refugees in Chad on 02 June. The Director of the Strategic Communications Department at the UAE’s foreign ministry issued a statement categorically refuting the allegations. Such claims of military support to warring factions of the Sudanese conflict from foreign patrons have been based on the close affiliation and business links between military leaders with states such as Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. For instance, RSF commander, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo has maintained close links with the UAE while SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has military and economic ties to Egypt.

ETHIOPIA: ongoing fighting between federal forces and Fano militias in Amhara region

Clashes between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and Fano militias in various localities in Amhara National Regional State continued during the week. Fighting  first broke out in late July in North Shewa, North Wello, Central Gondar, South Gondar, and South Wello zones. The trigger for the latest round of fighting was an announcement in April by the federal government outlining plans for the integration of regional special forces into different security sectors. The decision sparked violent protests across Amhara, led mainly by nationalists who felt that the move would weaken security and make the region more vulnerable to attacks from aggressors from other regions.

Tensions between the federal government and Amhara forces had been building up since the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement in November 2022 that brought the two-year conflict in Tigray to an end. During the conflict, the Fano and other Amhara ethnic militias had fought alongside the federal government but the relationship later deteriorated partly due to disagreements over the status of historically-disputed territory in western and southern Tigray which had been occupied by Amhara special forces during the war. The territory in question (specifically the Welkait, Tselemt, Humera, and Raya areas in Tigray region with large Amhara populations) has been at the centre of a dispute between Amhara and Tigray that goes back to the 1991-1994 transitional period when the Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPLF (which was then at the helm of a ruling federal coalition under the banner of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) annexed land that Amharans laid claim to.

In response to the violence, the federal government declared a six-month state of emergency on 04 August, empowering security services to implement a number of measures including the imposition of curfews, restrictions of movements, outlawing the carrying of weapons and conducting random searches. Authorities also blocked internet access and cancelled local flights to the region. Although the violence has remained localised within the Amhara region, underlying dynamics suggest prevailing political differences between the centre and periphery. Furthermore, the conflict converge with enduring ethnic tensions in other parts of the country with significantly destabilising effects.

NIGER: aftermath of the coup

Leaders from West African regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held a meeting on 10 August in Abuja, Nigeria to discuss how to further handle the situation in Niger in the wake of the coup on 26 July. Following the meeting, ECOWAS announced plans for the activation of its standby force, in addition to the imposition of additional sanctions on Niger’s coup leaders. Earlier in the week, the ruling junta in Niger had denied a joint delegation from ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations permission to enter the country on 07 August.

Separately, senior US diplomat and acting deputy secretary of state, Victoria Nuland, visited Niger on 07 August to meet the interim military leadership in an effort to push for a reversal of the coup. Although Nuland described her engagement with coup leaders as “frank”, her requests to meet with junta leader, General Abdourahamane Tiani, or the detained elected president, Mohamed Bazoum were denied. Resisting pressure from the regional bloc and the US, Niger’s ruling junta proceeded with efforts to establish a government, naming a 21-person cabinet which included generals that had aided in orchestrating the coup.

Despite the declared plans for robust action against Niger, divisions within ECOWAS itself, paired with questions about its ability to assemble the standby force, cast doubt on the feasibility of military action. Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of consensus among member states between those that are sympathetic to the Nigerien coup leadership, specifically Burkina Faso and Mali (both currently under military rule), and those that remain open to the possible use of force to ensure a return to civilian rule in Niger.  

As the standoff between the Nigerien coup leaders and ECOWAS lingers, the most likely scenario that could play out in the coming weeks is a move by the junta to entrench themselves as the legitimate government in Niamey. Barring the deployment of an ECOWAS military force, which remains unlikely at the moment, the military leadership could soon announce a unilateral transitional plan, following in the footsteps of Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea.

Amazon summit held in Belém, Brazil, 08-09 August

Eight South American countries that share the Amazon basin – Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Suriname – met in Belém (Brazil) for a two-day meeting of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization. The summit, which was the first in 14 years, centred around discussions on unified environmental policies, measures to end deforestation and strengthening regional cooperation on common issues. At the close of the summit, participating leaders adopted the Belém declaration which called for debt relief in exchange for climate action, greater commitment for cooperation water management, health, common negotiating positions at climate summits, and sustainable development; and protection of the rights of Indigenous groups. The joint declaration also outlined the establishment of  a scientific body expected to meet annually and to report on science related to the Amazon rainforest.

Overall, the final text was weaker than expected with member states failing to agree on a shared commitment to end deforestation by 2030. One of the main divisive issues was oil extraction with member states spurning a proposal by Colombian  President Gustavo Petro's campaign for an end to oil development. Amid the most vocal opponents to this proposal is Brazil which has its sights set on the development of a potentially huge offshore oil find in its northern coast near the mouth of the Amazon river, an area that is home to highly diverse biomes including mangroves, tropical forests and coral reefs.

Deforestation – the biggest environmental threat to the Amazon – also stood out as a contentious subject as each country was left free to define individual deforestation goals. According to the Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project, the Amazon biome has lost more than 85 million hectares or about 13% of its original area over the past 50 years mainly due to cattle ranching and cultivation of soybean crops. Other environmental threats are illegal logging, mining and oil drilling, with effects on water contamination and disruption of Indigenous lifestyles. Despite the failure of the summit to agree on a concrete and actionable plan to end deforestation, environmental activists have welcomed efforts by Lula’s administration to tackle deforestation with measures in recent months realising a reduction in deforestation by at least 60% in July, compared to the same month last year.

Looking ahead, a significant event pertaining to matters of conservation of rainforests and the world’s most critical basins will be the trilateral summit in Kinshasa, DRC on 25 August that will bring together the leaders of Brazil, DRC and Indonesia, representing the Amazon rainforest, the Congo basin and the Borneo-Mekong basin, respectively. The Kinshasa summit is aimed at strengthening cooperation on key policies central to the protection of rainforests in addition to promoting implementation of broader climate action goals.

Iran-US naval tensions in the Persian Gulf

Tensions have been flaring in the Strait of Hormuz in recent weeks in the wake of a series of seizures and harassment of commercial shipping vessels by Iran. The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is considered one of the world most critical maritime chokepoints with at least 20% of global oil shipments passing through the strait.

In the latest incidents, Iran seized Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker ‘Advantage Sweet’ on 27 April while it transited international waters in the Gulf of Oman. Shortly thereafter, a second vessel, the Panama-flagged oil tanker ‘Niovi’ was seized on 03 May while it was in transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the US navy, two other attempted commercial tanker seizures by Iran in July were thwarted following an intervention by US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul (DDG 74) in response to distress signals within the Gulf of Oman’s international waters. In response to Iran’s actions, the US Department of Defense announced that it would ramp up its military presence in the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Middle East region in a bid to safeguard freedom of navigation and defend U.S. interests in the region. Specifically, the US deployment included thousands of troops aboard the amphibious assault ships, namely the USS Bataan and he USS Carter Hall, in addition to fighter jets and various rotary-wing aircraft, tactical vehicles, and amphibious landing craft.

Reacting to the US’ latest deployment, the Iranian defence minister asserted that his country had made advancements in naval and technological spheres and was in a position to defend itself in the event of confrontation with US forces in the Persian Gulf. Iran has developed relatively sophisticated drone capabilities in recent years, including models such as the Shahed 136, a suicide drone that can achieve a maximum speed of 185km/h and is claimed to have a range of 2,500km. Iranian officials have also flaunted new missile systems with 1000 km ranges and better systems, emphasizing that the country was capable of defending regional waters.

With US-Iran relations already at a low point following the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, moves such as the military build-up by the US in the Persian Gulf could set off a cycle of escalation, with significant implications for regional stability and an elevated risk for potential confrontation between the two countries.