Five key developments in international relations this week: 31 Jul – 04 Aug 🔍🌍

SITREP : Sudan conflict

Fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued this week, primarily concentrated in the Khartoum and the neighbouring cities of Bahri and Omdurman. Clashes between the rival military forces, involving artillery and aerial bombardments, were reported in central and southern Khartoum as the SAF targeted RSF positions. On 02 August, the SAF reported that at least 12 RSF troops had been killed following a strike in the military complex near the Al Shajara area in West Khartoum where the army is besieged by the RSF. Intense fighting was also reported in the areas of El Masoudiya and the Giad industrial complex south of Khartoum, and in various neighbourhoods of Omdurman.

Elsewhere in West Darfur, the RSF and aligned forces attacked and razed the town of Sirba over several days starting on 24 July through at least 30 July. The Sudan Conflict Observatory, an independent US-based monitoring group that uses various data sources such as satellite imagery and thermal detection backed by local reporting, estimates that hundreds of civilians have been killed by RSF and allied militias, in addition to the destruction of 4463 structures in the town. Such violence in various parts of Darfur region in recent weeks adds to growing concerns about the resurgence of a pattern of ethnic-violence similar to what was witnessed during the genocide in the region between 2003 and 2020 which saw the targeting of non- Arab tribes by the Janjaweed and allied militias.

On another negative note, the prospects for mediation initiatives remain grim as the conflict parties retain hardline stances. On 02 August, the SAF spokesperson issued a statement denying reports of an imminent ceasefire on the back of the stalling of the recently revived Jeddah talks facilitated by the US and Saudi Arabia. Although reports on 27 July alluded to a potential cessation of hostilities in the making, prevailing disagreements over key issues such as the evacuation of citizens' homes in all areas of the capital and service facilities, hospitals and roads, as well as the Sudanese army’s affiliation with Islamist groupings, have proven to be major sticking points. Given the degree of mutual distrust and lack of goodwill among the conflict parties, a negotiated end to the fighting remains a remote possibility, at least in the short-term.

THE CARIBBEAN : Proposed multinational police force for Haiti under discussion

The deployment of a multinational force to assist police in Haiti in tackling gang violence seems to be on the cards in the near term after the US stated on 31 July that it planned to introduce a resolution at the UN Security Council for the authorisation of such a force. The statement from the US (which holds the presidency of the UNSC during August) came after Kenya’s foreign minister Alfred Mutua declared that his country was willing to lead a multinational force, in addition to deploying a contingent of 1,000 police officers to “help train and assist Haitian police restore normalcy in the country and protect strategic installations."  The next step would involve an assessment mission by Kenyan authorities in Haiti to work out operational and logistical details prior to deployment. Haiti has been grappling with gang violence that intensified after the 2021 assassination of president Jovenel Moïse; there were at least 434 reported civilian fatalities in 2022 and more than 2,000 kidnappings for ransom over the past 24 months. At the core of the violence are turf wars among at least 74 armed groups which are reported to have an active presence centred around Port-au-Prince municipality.

Despite repeated calls by the UN for deployment of a robust international force to help Haiti’s security forces quell the violence, no country agreed to lead such a mission, wary perhaps of getting caught up in the political instability fuelled by complex local dynamics and the risk of backlash in the event of a failed intervention. The local population has also increasingly questioned the legitimacy of international interventions given the history of abuse associated with such foreign missions in recent years. For instance, a UN peacekeeping mission from 2004 to 2017 was plagued with allegations of mass sexual abuse, including claims that peacekeepers raped and impregnated girls as young as 11. In 2010, sewage run-off from a UN peacekeeper camp into the country’s biggest river started a cholera epidemic that killed nearly 10,000 people.

News of Kenya’s planned involvement have been met with mixed reactions. Rights groups have raised questions about the poor track record of Kenyan police in their own country where security forces have been accused of using heavy-handed and lethal tactics against protesters. There is no consensus among Haitian civil society groups, with some stating that any international security assistance would be a welcome reprieve from the rising violence and deteriorating security situation. On the other hand, some local Haitian rights groups have expressed scepticism that such an international security mission would be best-placed to address the violence, underpinned by evolving and complex structural and systemic causal factors.

NIGER: aftermath of the coup

Developments linked to last week’s military takeover in Niger have taken on regional and international dimensions with arguably significant geopolitical implications. After former head of the presidential guard, Abdourahamane Tchiani, declared himself president in a televised address on 28 July, ECOWAS held an emergency meeting on 30 July and imposed sanctions on Niger and gave the junta a seven-day deadline to restore deposed President Bazoum or else face more punitive measures, including possible military intervention. As part of the sanctions, Nigeria – which supplies 70 percent of Niger’s power – cut the electricity supply to the country on 02 August.

In response, Burkina Faso and Mali, which are both led by military governments, issued a joint statement warning that any military intervention on ECOWAS’ part would be regarded as a declaration of war. Burkina Faso and Mali’s military leadership also condemned sanctions imposed against Niger. Similarly, Guinea’s President Mamady Doumbouya also voiced his support for Niger’s coup leaders.

The military intervention, should it take place, is expected to be spearheaded by Nigeria on account of hegemonic status in the region. Predictably, the threat of intervention has raised the spectre of a regional war and sharpened divisions among countries in West Africa. Meanwhile, France, the UK and the US began evacuating their citizens from the country. In Niamey, there were reports of protests on 03 August as crowds chanted anti-French slogans and denounced sanctions imposed by sanctions. Some of the protesters waved Russian flags although there is no clear evidence of direct involvement of Russia or the Wagner group.

The protests, underpinned by significant anti-French sentiment, are a broader reflection of the rejection of French neocolonial interference in its former colonies. The decline of French influence in its former colonies, mostly in West Africa, has played out in various forms in recent years. Starting with growing calls for an end to the use of the CFA franc, a currency arrangement that requires 14 countries to store 50 percent of their currency reserves with the French treasury, signs of a dying Françafrique have also included a backlash against long-drawn French military presence in Mali and Burkina Faso, culminating in the withdrawal of French troops from these countries. Notwithstanding these political developments, the anti-French sentiments should not be automatically equated with pro-Russian inclinations. Instead, developments such as those in Niger should be viewed in light of the structural and contextual drivers that have fostered conditions permissible for military coups and greater frequency of anti-regime protests.

Update*: As of 06 August, which marked the deadline for threat of military intervention by ECOWAS, there were no signs of military action. This can be chalked up to divisions among member states of the regional bloc regarding military option, with some arguing that the option of talks with the coup leaders had not been fully exhausted. From a different standpoint, it can be argued that ECOWAS threat had been a bluff from the outset and had no real prospects especially in light of lack of resources relative to the operational demand for intervention in a territory the size of Niger. Furthermore, ECOWAS is faced with the challenge of legitimacy on the back of what was perceived as subdued responses to similar military takeovers in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Cease-fire between Colombia and ELN starts

A six-month ceasefire between the Colombian government and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country’s largest rebel group, came into force on 03 August. The ceasefire is an outcome of 10 months of negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN. The ELN is a guerilla group that was formed in the 1960s by students and has sustained it operations over the years mainly due to involvement in drug trade and militant activities such as kidnapping and targeting of state institutions.

The peace talks with the ELN are part of President Gustavo Petro’s strategy of ‘Total Peace’, aimed at quelling the violence perpetrated by militant groups via negotiations and dialogue. More than 450,000 people have been killed in nearly six decades of armed conflict in Colombia. In 2016, the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), however various holdout groups have persisted with the violence against both civilians and the state amid evolving political demands and differences over conditions of settlement with authorities. If the latest ceasefire holds, it could be a positive step in realising a significant reduction of violence that has plagued the Colombian population, especially in the rural areas.

Relatedly, the UNSC also voted to expand the mandate of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia to monitor the ELN ceasefire, including the deployment of up to 68 additional international observers. Broadly, the ceasefire is a positive development for Colombia’s ongoing peace initiatives, however, its success in the long-term will largely be determined by clearly-stated terms of agreements with the various armed groups in order to stem proliferation of demands. Furthermore, the Colombian authorities will also have to clamp down on the methods that armed groups have used to entrench control over local population, including child recruitment, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced confinement.

UNITED STATES: Fitch downgrades US credit rating to AA+ from AAA

Fitch credit ratings agency on 01 August downgraded the US's long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating (IDR) to 'AA+' from the highest score available of 'AAA.' According to Fitch, the downgrade was attributable to “the expected fiscal deterioration over the next three years, a high and growing general government debt burden, and the erosion of governance relative to 'AA' and 'AAA' rated peers over the last two decades that has manifested in repeated debt limit standoffs and last-minute resolutions.”

The top three global ratings agencies: S&P Global, Fitch and Moody's, use the same system of letters, ranging from a top AAA rating through B, C, and D to reflect the economic and/or financial health of a borrower. These ratings are intended for use by investors to guide them in their investment choices.

The Biden administration responded angrily to the downgrade with Treasury Secretary Yellen calling  it “arbitrary” and “outdated.” However, the impact on the market was minimal given the historic reliability of US Treasury securities and the dollar’s status as the preeminent reserve currency, which further grounds the flexibility and liquidity of the US economy. For many economists, the downgrade was a reflection of previously-articulated assessments and projections of the trajectory of US-government debt. However, some have noted that the bigger impact was more reputational than material, adding to negative perceptions of the hegemony of the US dollar in the international economic order and the clamour by emerging powers, most notably the BRICS grouping, to begin moving away from the US dollar as the dominant reserve currency. However, at present, the downgrade has not had any significant impact on the bond market US Treasuries are still largely viewed as safe and reliable bets by major investors.