Five key developments in international relations this week: 28 Aug – 01 Sep🔍🌍

SITREP : Sudan conflict

Dozens of casualties were reported on 30 August in ongoing clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Nyala, South Darfur state. The violence, which has entailed the use of heavy artillery, has persisted in bouts since 11 August, fuelling displacement of thousands of people from the area. The casualty toll as a result of the violence has also been climbing. In one instance, at least 42 people were killed and dozens injured on 22 August following shelling in the Teiba and El Sikka Hadid neighbourhoods. The victims were reportedly seeking shelter under a bridge connecting the two neighbourhoods when the strike occurred. It was not immediately clear which faction was responsible for the shelling as the RSF and SAF have traded accusations.

Meanwhile, army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, made a one-day visit to Egypt on 29 August where he held talks with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in the town of  El Alamein. There were no specific initiatives announced following the meeting, suggesting that the trip was probably intended as a power move for Burhan’s part, seeking to portray himself as the legitimate Sudanese head of state in the eyes of foreign patrons and international actors.  As the realities on the ground point to what is likely to be a protracted conflict, the head of the RSF, Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, on 28 August published a 10-point peace proposal that included aspects such as the creation of a non-symmetrical federal system, unified and integrated armed forces under civilian oversight. The proposal has been swiftly dismissed by various Sudanese activists and rights groups who have underlined mounting allegations of the RSF’s perpetration of atrocities against civilians, including torture, extrajudicial killing and sexual violence against women and girls. Furthermore, Burhan has outrightly refused to engage in any negotiations with the RSF, whom he has labelled as “traitors”.

Gabon: coup d’état sees Bongo deposed

A group of senior military officers in Gabon announced on 30 August that they had deposed President Ali Bongo and seized power. This came shortly after the electoral authority announced that Bongo, who had been in power since 2009, had been  re-elected for a third term in polls that took place on 26 August. The latest military takeover is the seventh coup in west and central Africa since 2020. Bongo, who was detained in his residence, later appeared in a video calling on “friends of Gabon” to “make some noise” to support him.

The coup leaders, who called themselves “the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions,” said they were ending the current regime as a result of ‘irresponsible and unpredictable governance, ” which has fostered institutional, political, economic and social crisis. The soldiers also said that the election results had been cancelled. In addition to the imposition of a night curfew, the country’s borders were closed and several state institutions suspended.

On 31 August, the AU suspended Gabon's membership. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) also condemned the coup and said it would hold a meeting soon to discuss how it would handle the situation. Across the world, various actors responded to the development in Gabon: France condemned the coup, the European Union expressed concern about implications of the coup for regional stability while underscoring issues linked to a flawed electoral process while the US also called for a restoration of civilian rule.

Broadly, the coup in Gabon can be viewed as part of a recent trend of military takeovers in West and Central Africa, fuelled by multi-layered drivers including governance failures, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and insecurity. However, the Gabonese context also differs from the other cases in several aspects. For one, unlike in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, where the military takeover has been linked to insecurity as a result of the jihadist violence, a major issue in Gabon’s case has been widespread discontent with the dynastic rule under the Bongo regime which has been in power for over 50 years. Indeed, the scenes of jubilant crowds in Libreville when news of the coup broke out suggest that some of the public was supportive of the junta’s goal of putting an end to the oppressive and corrupt regime which had one little to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. In this regard, the Gabonese case may be an interesting convergence of interests in terms of deposing autocratic leadership and dismantling one-man rule. With respect to the transitional process and the consolidation of democratic rule, there may be divergences between the citizenry and the military authorities, particularly regarding issues such as the length of transitional period, the legitimacy and selection of representatives and reconfiguration of a functional social contract, and civil-military relations.

ASIA

Singapore: presidential vote seen as key test for ruling party

Singapore held its ninth presidential elections on 01 September to elect a replacement for incumbent President Halimah Yacob. Former deputy prime minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, who was seen as the frontrunner,  took the win in a landslide victory with 70.4% of votes. Shanmugaratnam faced off against Ng Kok Song, a former chief investment officer of Singapore sovereign wealth fund GIC, who took second place with 15.7%, and  Tan Kin Lian, who came in third with 13.9%.

This election had been perceived as a key test of the level of support for the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) which had been caught up in a series of scandals in recent months, including a corruption probe into the transport minister and the resignations of two PAP legislators over an affair. Moreover, this was the first time that presidential elections were open to all ethnicities, a welcome acknowledgement of diversity in the country. While largely seen as a ceremonial position, the president formally oversees the city's accumulated financial reserves and holds the power to veto certain measures and approve anti-corruption investigations.

Analysts argue that Shanmugaratnam’s victory, despite the issues faced by the PAP, was an endorsement of his personal track record in politics and the appeal of his campaign under the slogan “Respect for All”. Moreover, his win demonstrated the electorate’s ability to separate crucial electoral issues from the party troubles, and demonstratively backing a candidate who could serve their interests at the end of the day.

LATIN AMERICA

Ecuador: intensifying violence

Four car bombs exploded in various parts of Ecuador on 30 and 31 August; there were no reported casualties. Two of the blasts occurred in Quito, while the other two took place in El Oro province, bordering Peru. Authorities said that the bombings were most likely the actions of criminal groups in response to prison transfers facilitated by the corrections system. The latest incidents come in the wake of the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio who was gunned down while  leaving a campaign rally in Quito on the evening of 09 August.

The cocaine trade is at the centre of the security crisis in Ecuador, which acts as a key transit hub linking the production bases in Colombia to markets in the US, Europe and Asia. The increased cocaine flows through the country have raised stakes for criminal groups who compete for control over drug routes and dominance over territories, including within prisons. Criminal gangs such as Los Choneros and Los Lobos have also expanded their operations beyond the drug trade to extortions. As part of their violent tactics, these criminal gangs also carry out hired killings, adding to the growing rate of homicides in the country. According to InSight Crime, homicide rates were at 86.3% in 2022, estimated at 25.9 per 100,000. The rising violence has also been fuelled by the involvement of cartels from Mexico such as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel which have formalised alliances with Los Choneros.

Looking ahead to run-offs on 15 October, two final candidates remain : Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution Movement (Movimiento Revolución Ciudadana), and Daniel Noboa of National Democratic Action (Acción Democrática Nacional - ADN).  Both candidates have limited options in the face of the worsening security situation, inextricably linked to the lucrative cocaine trade under the control of powerful gangs. The security interventions by the state – implementing states of emergency and increasing the capacity of the country’s prisons – seem to be inadequate in addressing the magnitude of the gang violence.

Haiti: proposal of an international force gaining traction

There has been speculation that the deployment of a UN-mandated force, could materialise in the coming weeks, with one report claiming that the UN Security Council will vote on the matter as early as 15 September, This follows a visit by 10-member Kenyan security assessment team which held meetings 21-22 August in Port-au-Prince with government officials. On 30 August, the US urged its citizens to leave Haiti “as soon as possible” due to increased violence.

Earlier in July, Kenya’s foreign minister Alfred Mutua declared that his country was willing to lead a multinational force to assist police in Haiti in tackling violence by armed gangs. Haiti has been grappling with gang violence that intensified after the 2021 assassination of president Jovenel Moïse; there were at least 434 reported civilian fatalities in 2022 and more than 2,000 kidnappings for ransom over the past 24 months. At the core of the violence are turf wars between over 74 armed groups which are reported to have an active presence centred around Port-au-Prince municipality. In the latest incident, at least ten people were killed when gang members opened fire on a group of churchgoers armed with sticks, pikes, and machetes who were protesting against a gang notorious for carrying out massacres in the Canaan settlement.

There are several questions that are yet to be addressed with regards to the proposed multinational force. For instance, it is not yet clear what its specific mandate would be, its operational timeline, rules of engagement etc. Furthermore, there is the thorny issue of legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the local Haitian population that is wary of international intervention in light of the tainted history of foreign missions in the country.