Five key developments in international relations this week: 03-07 July 🔍🌍

SITREP: Sudan conflict

Omdurman was at the centre of fierce battles this week in the ongoing fight between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by his former deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. According to local reports on 04 July, there were ground battles in several parts of Omdurman , in addition to air and artillery strikes that have become a main feature of the violence. On the same day, the RSF downed a fighter jet belonging to the army in Omdurman and residents posted videos of pilots parachuting from the warplane.

In Khartoum, air strikes on 05 July by the SAF on RSF positions in the Bad Nuwabi area and the new market resulted in at least four civilian casualties. Additional SAF-RSF confrontations were also reported in the area of El Shajara armoured corps military base as the Air force carried out sorties for most of the day.

As highlighted in last week’s newsletter, the widening of the conflict to a new axis in the Darfur region has mounted concerns about a repeat of the 2003 genocide amid reports last month of the targeting of civilians by RSF and allied Arab militias in El Geneina, West Darfur state. In what is largely seen as an instance of ethnicity-based violence, civilians fleeing into neighbouring Chad in late June recounted horrific scenes of seeing dozens of bodies on the road between El Geneina and the border with Chad and the targeting of members of the Masalit community by RSF-supported Arab militias. On 03 July, various Arab tribes in Darfur declared their allegiance to the RSF, adding to fears of renewed conflict in the region, fuelled mainly by long-standing tensions between Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups.

On 05 July, UN agencies condemned increasing gender-based violence in Sudan, amid reports of 21 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence against at least 57 women and girls since the conflict erupted on 15 April. Such incidents amount to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, aggravated by the worsening security situation and humanitarian crisis marked by destruction of critical infrastructure and acute shortages of food, water and medicines.

Senegal: C'est un non… pour le moment

President Macky Sall on 03 July announced that he will not run for a third term in presidential elections in February next year. Sall had kept mum for a number of years as to whether he would run for a third term, following a constitutional revision in 2016 that set a two-term presidential limit and shortened the presidential term to five years from seven. Sall was first elected in 2012 for a seven-year term after prevailing against then-President Abdoulaye Wade, and again in 2019 for a five-year term.

The political uncertainty around whether Sall would seek a third term or not has been compounded by the prosecution of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko since 2021 on charges of rape and a defamation lawsuit. On 01 June, a court in Dakar acquitted Sonko of rape while sentencing him to two years' imprisonment on a charge of "corrupting young people.” Sonko’s arrest and prosecution prompted several bouts of protest activity since 2021. His supporters have maintained that the charges against him were a ploy to disqualify him from the 2024 elections on legal grounds. The latest episodes of demonstrations in Dakar in late May, which involved violent clashes between protesters and security forces, resulted in at least 16 fatalities and dozens of injuries.

The political protests took the shine off Senegal’s reputation as a bastion of democracy in West Africa and aggravated concerns about a discernible pattern of democratic regression in a number of African states in recent years. Indeed, Sall’s announcement brought a sense of relief among civil society and political groupings in Senegal and the region, although prevailing civil unrest related to Sonko’s fate should not be discounted in the immediate term.

Latin America: EU-MERCOSUR trade deal negotiations back on track?

Brazil assumed on 04 July the presidency of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR; a Southern American trade bloc comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), taking over from Argentina. Top of the agenda is the finalization of a trade deal with the European Union (EU) that is yet to be signed since negotiations, which lasted over two decades, were finalised in 2019.

The envisaged free trade agreement is poised to deepen trade and economic ties between the EU and the MERCOSUR bloc, while also strengthening the strategic partnership with the broader Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) within the framework of EU-CELAC cooperation. Although an EU-MERCOSUR trade pact was agreed upon in principle in 2019, the sign-off has stalled due to concerns over deforestation in the Amazon and French farmers’ fear of competition from Brazilian beef. In addition to environmental issues, questions have also been raised about labour rights protection and related safeguards and guarantees.

A glance at EU-MERCOSUR trade figures

• The EU is Mercosur's second largest trade partner, after China. EU exports to Mercosur were €45 billion in goods in 2021 and €17 billion in services in 2020.

• In 2021, the EU's exports to the four Mercosur countries totalled €45 billion, while Mercosur's exports to the EU were €43 billion.

•  Mercosur's biggest exports to the EU in 2021 were mineral products (22.3% of total exports), vegetable products including soya and coffee (20.7%), and foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (19.1%)

•  The EU is the biggest foreign investor in Mercosur with a stock of €330 billion in 2020

The renewed focus on the EU- MERCOSUR FTA comes at what many see as a propitious moment for a deal: the upcoming EU-CELAC summit on 17 and 18 July in Brussels, Brazil’s presidency of Mercosur bloc and Spain’s presidency of the Council of the EU in the latter half of this year are both seen as favourable developments for the trade pact.

From a geopolitical perspective, the ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine war, coupled with the imperative of diversification of energy and raw materials sources has also steered the EU closer to Latin America given its geo-strategic standing. Latin America’s abundant natural resources, including oil, natural gas and critical raw materials such as lithium, copper and cobalt are fundamental for the EU’s green energy transition and bode well for its broader strategy to limit exposure to risks linked to supply-chain disruptions. As in Africa, the Latin American region has also emerged as a site of strategic rivalry between great powers with the EU looking to counter Chinese dominance over commodity trade and investment and the expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to over 20 countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region.

Looking ahead, although there is presently a window of opportunity for the deal to be finalised, the same political obstacles that led to its stalling in 2019 persist, which means that its backers will have to present a strong case to wide array of opponents including, wary electorates on both sides, environmental and climate action activists, and advocates for protectionist measures.

Eurasia: SCO virtual summit, 04 July

Iran became the ninth member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) during a virtual summit of the grouping on 04 July under India’s presidency. The SCO, established in 2001, was initially comprised of China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as permanent members, while Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia  hold observer status. As presently constituted, the SCO is the world’s largest regional organisation, covering close to 50 percent of the world’s population and more than 30 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP).

Over the years, the SCO’s mandate expanded from its original focus on the “three evils”—terrorism, separatism, and extremism, to include a broad range of issue areas covering political and economic integration, energy security, supply-chain stability, sustainable development, alongside a joint vision to promote a representative, just, democratic and multipolar world order.

The outcome of the latest summit was the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration which presented the organisation’s rationale as platform for broad cooperation, inclusivity and consensus-building, shunning its reductionist portrayal as merely a counterpoint to the Western-led hegemonic order.  Despite the internal differences among member states and points of contention such as China-India tensions, the Pakistan-Indian rivalry and unresolved border disputes among the Central Asian countries, the summit outcomes are indicative of a convergence  around pivotal issues such as enhanced Eurasian connectivity, regional security and economic cooperation.

In light of its geostrategic position in Eurasia and the Middle East, Iran’s membership of the SCO comes with significant implications for not only regional integration, but also connectivity, security and the evolving geopolitical landscape. Iran’s abundant oil and gas resources are a major boost for the SCO’s trade and economic development in the energy sector. Furthermore, Iran’s infrastructure serves a vital nodal points for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)  and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INTSC), with positive implications for strategic connectivity underpinned by multi-modal infrastructure development and deepening trade links.

Overall, the SCO’s expansion and related developments relating to the Eurasian regional order are representative of major changes in the international order characterised by shifts in the distribution of power and revitalised regionalism underpinned by imperatives that range from political and economic integration, to security and normative consensus. When viewed alongside the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the SCO is well-positioned as one of the hallmarks of the emerging multipolar world.

Botswana and De Beers Group sign pivotal mining deal

The government of Botswana and the De Beers Group on 01 July signed a  new 10-year sales agreement that would see the former increase its revenue shares from 30% to 50% of diamond sales. In addition to increased stakes in Bostwana’s diamond industry, the agreement also provided for the creation of a multi-billion Pula Diamonds for Development Fund, with an upfront investment by De Beers of BWP 1 billion, to be directed towards diversified investment in additional sectors including agriculture, climate change, solar development, and tourism. The two parties also agreed to extend mining licences for a 25-year period through to 2054.

Botswana is Africa’s largest diamond producer; the industry accounts for over 30% to gross domestic product (GDP) and up to 90% of exports.  The Debswana mining company – a joint venture between De Beers and the Botswana government – dominates the diamond value chain in the country with operations in four mines, including Jwaneng, one of the world's richest diamond mines.

While both parties have welcomed the new agreement as a key step in enhancing the investment partnership and ensuring mutual benefit and sustainable development beyond the extractive sector, the process of getting to the agreement entailed complex negotiations that were often prone to politics and wrangling among various stakeholders. At some point during the negotiations, which went on for several years, Botswana’s President Mokgweetsi Masisi repeatedly asserted that his country was prepared to walk away from negotiations if a more favourable deal was not reached.

Broadly, the agreement is expected to enhance development in Botswana’s diamond sector – the mainstay of its economy, which in turn could bring about significant economic benefits in the medium-to-long term. The move towards securing a  greater stake in the extractive sector value chain also bodes well for the broader drive across the African continent for greater ownership in investment and production of natural resources while simultaneously advancing strategic partnerships.