Five key developments in international relations this week: 27-31 Jan 2025🔍🌍

⚔️⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) made significant gains in central Khartoum, including breaking a months-long siege of its General Command and reconnecting with besieged forces in Kober and northern Khartoum. The SAF’s recapture of central Khartoum and most parts of Bahri, has been characterised as a turning point in the conflict as it seeks to gain control of the capital and expel the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which still has control over several districts in the tri-city area. Shortly after the recapture of General Command, SAF army chief al-Burhan commended his troops and highlighted intention of the army to take control of not only the capital but the entire country,  a sign of limited interest in negotiations. For his part, RSF commander, Hemedti, acknowledged the setbacks but urged his troops to press on. More fighting in Khartoum and Bahri is expected in the coming weeks, especially as the army seeks to build on its momentum and launch new offensives south, west and east from its headquarters.

Meanwhile, the RSF continued its offensive in el- Fasher, North Darfur state. On 26 January, it launched a drone attack on the Saudi Teaching Maternal Hospital which killed at least 70 people and wounded 19 others. As the RSF seeks to consolidate power in the western regions of Sudan, there were reports on 30 January that it had begun moving heavy weaponry and specialized military equipment from its Maatan al-Sarah base in Libya, near the Chadian border, into Darfur.This development indicates a potential escalation of violence as RSF prepares for renewed confrontations with the SAF and allied forces. If the RSF successfully captures el-Fasher, it could set the stage for setting up its own government, potentially mirroring a partitioned state similar to Libya– where there are two rival governments.

Conflict in the eastern DRC – M23 rebel group capture Goma, set out on southward advance towards Bukavu (South Kivu)

On 27 January, the M23 captured the city of Goma – a key logistics and diplomatic hub and provincial capital of North Kivu province – marking a significant escalation in the crisis in eastern DRC. Goma’s takeover follows a rapid advance in recent weeks which saw the M23 assert control over large swathes of territory across North Kivu. The M23 rebels announced their capture of the city in a statement issued minutes before the expiration of a 48-hour ultimatum demanding the Congolese army's surrender of their weapons. After intense fighting between the M23 and Congolese government forces, there were reports of relative calm in the city apart from sporadic gunfire in the outer districts. Although the exact death toll is difficult to ascertain, at least a hundred people are reported to have been killed and nearly 1,000 injured as a result of the fighting.

The latest round of fighting also resulted in the death of 17 peacekeepers who were backing the Congolese forces in pushing back the M23 forces. The fatalities included 13 South African soldiers and others from Malawi and Uruguay deployed as part of the Southern African Development Community regional force (SAMIDRC) or under the UN mission in Congo (MONUSCO).

As the fall of Goma to the advancing M23 appeared imminent, the UN Security Council convened an emergency meeting on 26 January which saw a tense exchange between diplomats of DRC and Rwanda. The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs explicitly called out Rwanda for its alleged support of the M23, asserting that actions on the ground amounted to a ‘declaration of war.’ In response, Rwanda’s representative told the UNSC that ‘the current crisis could have been averted had the DRC Government demonstrated a genuine commitment to peace.’ The UNSC subsequently issued a press statement, which, among others, condemned ‘the ongoing flagrant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, including the presence in the Eastern DRC of external Forces’ and ‘demanded that these forces withdraw immediately and that the M23 put an end to the establishment of parallel administrations in the DRC territory .’

Apart from the deteriorating security situation, the M23’s advance also compounded a dire humanitarian crisis amidst mass displacement, shortages of food, water and medical supplies. According to UN reports, at least 700,000 people have been internally displaced within North Kivu and South Kivu. There have also been reports of human rights violations, including summary executions and sexual violence.

Elsewhere, there were protests in the DRC’s capital Kinshasa, on 28 January which saw attacks on various foreign embassies including those of France, Belgium, the United States, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya. Demonstrators expressed anger and frustration over perceived international inaction regarding the ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC.

The situation in Goma and its surrounding areas has sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council convened an emergency ministerial meeting on 28 January on the situation in eastern DRC. In its resolution, the PSC condemned the attacks by the M23 and urged Rwanda and DRC to return to diplomatic resolution under the framework of the Luanda process, facilitated by Angolan president, João Manuel Lourenço. Kenya’s President William Ruto, the current chair of the EAC, called for an extraordinary summit on 29 January. Following the meeting, which was attended by Rwandan President Paul Kagame but skipped by his Congolese counterpart Felix Tshisekedi, EAC leaders called on all parties to the conflict in eastern DRC to cease hostilities and observe an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and facilitate humanitarian access to the affected population.

Similarly, on 31 January, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held an extraordinary summit to discuss the escalating situation in the DRC. In a communiqué issued after the summit, SADC leaders condemned the attacks by M23 against SAMIDRC troops, reiterating continued support for the mission in carrying out its mandate in eastern DRC. Interestingly, the communiqué characterises SAMIDRC as a ‘peacekeeping mission’ which stands in contrast to the current Status of Forces Agreement at the time when the mission was initially deployed on 15 December 2023. The deployment of the SADC Standby Force was informed by the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, which in turn formed the legal basis for its mandate. Specifically, SAMIDRC was accorded an offensive mandate, including the task to support the DRC to ‘neutralise negative forces and armed groups’ in Eastern DRC and restore and maintain peace and security.

The framing and narrative around SAMIDRC and its mandate turned out to be a point of contention at the centre of a diplomatic spat between Rwanda and South Africa, which is the lead nation in the mission. In the wake of the death of 13 SANDF personnel, who were killed in clashes with the M23, President Ramaphosa issued a statement accusing the Rwanda-backed rebel group of attacking peacekeepers fighting alongside the Congolese forces (FARDC). In a fierce rebuttal, Kagame labelled Ramaphosa's claims as ‘distortions’ and ‘lies’, a misrepresentation of discussions held over phone between the two leaders earlier in the week.  He asserted that it was not M23 but rather the Congolese army responsible for the deaths of South African troops. He also questioned South Africa's capability to mediate in the DRC conflict, suggesting that it is ‘not in a position to assume the role of peacemaker.’ The heated exchange between the leaders is reflective of long-standing tensions between Rwanda and South Africa which have been marked by previous diplomatic incidents.

The M23’s offensive and takeover of Goma is a remarkable déjà vu of its encirclement and capture of Goma in 2012. Following a counter-offensive launched by the Force Intervention Brigade ( a special component of MONUSCO) alongside FARDC troops, the M23 were routed from Goma and later agreed to sign a ceasefire deal with the Congolese government in 2013. This time around, there are notable differences. For one, the M23 is well trained and armed, thanks to its Rwandan patronage. The rebel group’s strategic goals have also evolved beyond the initial fight for the rights of ethnic Tutsi population in eastern DRC to what now seems like territorial expansion and control over mineral-rich regions. Furthermore, the M23’s affiliation with the Congo River Alliance (AFC), a coalition of rebels that is hostile to the regime in Kinshasa, suggests the makings of a broader insurgency that could spread to other parts of the country. Now with most of North Kivu under their control, the rebel group have their sights on Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. As per reports on 30 January, M23 fighters were within striking distance of a strategic military airport in the city of Kavumu, located about 40km north of Bukavu, and were facing stiff resistance from Congolese forces backed by Burundian troops. This southward advance could broaden the conflict, drawing in Burundi which has a strategic interest in securing South Kivu.

Overall, the takeover of Goma is a turning point in the conflict. There is a risk of intensification  of fighting should President Tshisekedi shun the calls for talks, and instead push for a military solution. On the other hand, the stronger bargaining position of the M23 could force the Congolese government to concede and engage in direct talks. Regional and international actors also have a role to play in pushing for a pacific settlement. There is need for greater coordination between the regional initiatives; mediators could work with the Luanda and Nairobi processes in presenting a middle ground to the conflict parties. Further afield, Rwanda’s Western backers should also pile pressure on Kigali to desist from its destabilising actions in the DRC, or else face sanctions or withdrawal of financial aid.

⚡Geopolitics

Denmark commits $2 billion for Arctic defence

On 27 January, Denmark announced a $2 billion security package for Greenland, aimed at enhancing its defence capabilities in the region. The agreement, which was made with the collaboration of the Greenlandic and Faroese governments, entails the purchase of three Arctic patrol vessels, two long-range surveillance drones, and new maritime patrol aircraft. The new procurement programme is intended to replace outdated assets (such as four Thetis class patrol boats commissioned in the early 1990s) and improve surveillance capabilities. Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated that the decision was made based on assessments of the worsening threat level in the Arctic and North Atlantic, driven by the presence and activities of competing world powers.

The Arctic  is rich in natural resources, estimated to hold about 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of the world’s natural gas reserves. The melting ice caps are opening new shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route, which significantly reduce travel times between Europe and Asia. As a result, the Arctic is a key site of geopolitical competition and great power rivalry. For instance, Russia has ramped up military activities in the Arctic, modernizing bases and conducting joint military operations with China. China’s interests in the Arctic are linked to its vision to build a Polar Silk Road to enhance connectivity with Europe and augment its strategy for energy security. For the U.S, the Arctic’s oil and gas resources are crucial for its energy security, in addition to its potential as an arena for power projection. The U.S. has a significant military presence in the Arctic, including the Pituffik Space Base in Greenland and several bases in Alaska which serve as operational hubs for surveillance, training and logistics support for various missions across the region.

Denmark’s military modernization effort also occurs against the backdrop of Trump’s stated desire to buy Greenland, with suggestions that he might use military or economic coercion to acquire it, despite the Danish government’s repeated assertions that Greenland is not for sale. In this regard, the latest initiatives are designed to bolster Danish sovereignty while also strengthening cooperation with NATO allies in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

🔶U.S. Foreign Policy

Trump’s immigration policy and row with Colombia over deportation of migrants

On 26 January 2025, tensions escalated when Colombian President Gustavo Petro refused to allow two U.S. military flights carrying deported Colombian migrants to land in the country. Petro insisted that he would not accept migrants who were not treated with dignity and respect. President Trump retaliated with threats to impose 25 percent tariffs on Colombian goods and visa restrictions on government officials. After hours of heated exchange, President Petro capitulated and accepted the deported individuals without limitations or delays. The White House declared the climbdown a victory for Trump's hardline immigration policies. On 28 January, the Colombian government confirmed that two planes carrying migrants had landed.

A trade would have been detrimental to the Colombian economy – the U.S. is Colombia’s largest trading partner, accounting for 34% of Colombia’s total trade. Sanctions would have led to the loss of thousands of jobs, particularly in sectors like oil and gas, gold, coffee, and flowers.

The incident demonstrates Trump’s inclination to use coercive measures such as tariffs and sanctions to subject other countries to the U.S.’ demands and interests. Furthermore, Trump's actions reflect pursuit of the "America First" approach, which was the cornerstone of his presidential campaign and has increasingly informed a range of domestic and foreign policy decisions under his administration. For Trump, primacy seems to be the overarching objective, regardless of whether this comes at the expense of relations with allies or strategic partners. The aggressive approach by the U.S will alienate partners in the region, and could impact relations across the board, including areas such as security or development cooperation.

🫱🏾‍🫲🏾Multilateralism

Africa Energy Summit concludes with adoption of the Dar es Salaam Energy Declaration

The Africa Energy Summit was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 27-28 January. The summit brought together 30 African heads of state and over 1,000 delegates to endorse the Dar es Salaam Declaration, which aims to provide affordable electricity to 300 million Africans by 2030. 12 countries – Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia – presented detailed National Energy Compacts that set targets to scale up electricity access, increase the use of renewable energy and attract additional private capital.

The Mission 300 initiative aims to halve the number of people without electricity by 2030 through coordinated efforts among governments, development banks, and private sector partners. The initiative is backed by substantial financial commitments exceeding $50 billion, with pledges from various multilateral development institutions to support electrification and clean cooking efforts across the continent.

The emphasis on country-led, sustainable, and collaborative solutions offers a promising path to providing reliable, affordable energy to fuel economic growth in African countries, however successful implementation will be determined by continued political commitment, policy reforms, and the ability to effectively mobilise public and private sector resources. The implementation of the Mission 300 initiative will entail a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation, including robust accountability measures, country-specific systems and policy alignment with SDG agenda and AU’s Agenda 2063.

In these uncertain and volatile times, forecasting is tricky business. Analysts working on Visual Capitalist's Prediction Consensus analysed over 800 forecasts compiled from reports, interviews, and podcasts to highlight the most cited trends, forecasts and geopolitical predictions for 2025.

Here’s a helpful visual of the Geopolitical ‘bingo card’ for 2025: