Five key developments in international relations this week: 10-14 Mar 2025🔍🌍

⚔️⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

As reported in last week’s update, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) were on the verge of taking over the entirety of Khartoum and the capital region, on the back of a multi-pronged offensive that began in late 2024. Sudan War Monitor reports that the SAF have taken full control of the East Nile locality, after advancing on RSF positions and securing key installations, including East Nile Hospital and the locality headquarters in Hillat Kuku, over the past few days. Only a few neighbourhoods in Ombada locality, some areas in Khartoum locality, and Jebel Awlia remain under RSF control, whose forces have been cut off from critical supply lines in Bahri and East Nile.

With RSF fighters still entrenched in some neighbourhoods in the east and south of Khartoum, the coming days are likely to see an intensification of clashes as the SAF accelerates its offensive towards the presidential palace, the air force headquarters, the Yarmouk Military Production Complex, the Central Reserve Police headquarters, in an effort to link up its forces.

Elsewhere, at least 10 civilians were killed and 23 others injured in artillery shelling by the RSF in el-Fasher, capital of North Darfur state. This comes as the RSF seeks to consolidate its hold over the Darfur region, where it controls four of the region’s five states, except for North Darfur.

Evidence of the grave human rights violations and torture of detainees continues to mount with the discovery of a secret mass grave at a detention centre that was previously controlled by the RSF, located about 60 km north of Khartoum. The detention centre was discovered shortly after the SAF seized control of the RSF base in Garri, which also led to the discovery of a large burial site with at least 550 unmarked graves. The findings confirm detailed reports of  brutal atrocities committed by the RSF since the war began in April 2023, which include arbitrary detention, torture and killing of detainees. The SAF has also been complicit in the commission of mass atrocities. In addition to targeting of civilians, there have also been reports of reprisal attacks on activists, human rights defenders, medical workers and humanitarian workers, who are thought to be RSF collaborators.

The humanitarian situation remains grim and continues to deteriorate: approximately 12.8 million people have been displaced as a result of the conflict, and approximately 24.6 million people at risk of starvation as a result of food shortages. The termination of USAID funding will also exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, forcing closure of emergency food kitchens – critical lifelines for nearly 2 million people. Moreover, there is a considerable shortfall of humanitarian funding – the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) for Sudan  requires $4.16 billion, but as of February 2025, it was only 6.3% funded.

U.S and Ukraine propose ceasefire deal, Putin emphasizes need for ‘nuanced’ discussions on key aspects

The U.S and Ukraine on 11 March proposed a 30-day ceasefire as a potential step in ending the three-year conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The proposed ceasefire, the outcome of a meeting between U.S. and Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, made reference to the exchange of prisoners of war and the release of civilian detainees. A joint statement released after the meeting did not mention sanctions on Russia or security guarantees for Ukraine, although it did indicate that Ukraine’s European allies would be involved in the peace process. Following Ukraine’s agreement on this ceasefire proposal, the U.S. resumed military aid and intelligence sharing with Kiev, which had been temporarily suspended

In response to the proposed ceasefire, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on 13 March that he supported the notion of a ceasefire in principle, noting that there were several "nuances" and "issues" that warranted further discussion with the U.S. In addition, President Putin brought up the situation with Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region, where Russian troops have regained territory from an incursion by Ukrainian troops launched in August 2024. The remaining troops have been completely isolated by Russian forces. Putin offered the Ukrainian servicemen guaranteed safety and merciful treatment if they surrender, an offer that was quickly dismissed by Kiev. Another concern raised by Putin was that the 30-day ceasefire could simply be a brief reset to allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm. He also questioned how such a ceasefire along the extensive 2,000-kilometre front would be monitored and how violations would be verified.

In light of Russia’s significant advantages on the battlefront, it is highly unlikely that Moscow will accept any ceasefire if its demands are not addressed. These demands, which have remained unchanged since the onset of the war in February 2022, include the demilitarisation of Ukraine, Ukraine's neutral status and assurances that NATO will not include Ukraine as a member, and recognition of Crimea and the four partially occupied regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—as Russian territory.

Looking ahead, Trump and Putin are expected hold a phone conversation on 18 March to discuss the prospects of a peace agreement to end the war in Ukraine. However, the conditions outlined by Russia, paired with the incompatibility of positions outlined by Ukraine’s Western allies, signal what is likely to be a complex and protracted negotiations process. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron have taken the lead in assembling a “coalition of the willing,” comprised of nearly 30 countries, mostly European allies of Ukraine, who are committed to stepping up military and financial support for Ukraine in the lead up to any potential peace negotiations. With the complex diplomatic context in mind, the evolving military situation on the ground, which Russia deems to be in its favour, could also be a significant factor in shaping the outcome of the war.

SADC ends mandate of its mission in DRC, Angola to mediate talks on 18 March

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 13 March terminated the mandate of the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), following an extraordinary summit during which the regional bloc’s leaders discussed the conflict in eastern DRC. In a communiqué following the summit, SADC said it received the latest updates on the security situation in the Eastern DRC, noting the decision to terminate SAMIDRC’s mandate and commencement of phased withdrawal of troops.

The decision to withdraw troops comes after weeks of speculation that SAMIDRC would be terminated following the deaths of 18 SADC troops in fighting around Goma and Sake in North Kivu in late January.

The summit took place shortly after Angola announced on 12 March that it would broker talks between the DRC government and M23 rebels scheduled to begin in the Angolan capital, Luanda, on 18 March. The Angolan-mediated Luanda process between the DRC and Rwanda broke down in December 2024 when Rwanda insisted that the DRC engage directly with the M23 in order for talks to proceed. The DRC has long ruled out direct negotiations with M23, which it brands as “terrorists” and a Rwandan proxy. The Congolese government announced it would send representatives to the talks, but did not disclose the members of its delegation. M23 acknowledged Angola’s invitation, with spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka confirming the receipt of the invite but stopping short of saying whether the group would participate.

Despite these calls for peace, local reports from 16 March indicate that clashes have continued, with fighting reported in the Walikale region. Both the Congolese governement and the M23 have previously violated ceasefire agreements, diminishing prospects regarding the sustainability of the current truce efforts. Overall, M23 seeks to legitimize control over the areas that it has captured in North and South Kivu, including in Goma and Bukavu, and possibly expand its influence in the DRC as a legitimate political party as part of any long-term agreement with the DRC government. The group’s systematic effort to establish “state-like” administrative systems in the parts of eastern DRC under its control indicates that the group intends to control these areas in the long-term. For his part, President Tshisekedi is unlikely to concede to any of M23’s demands as this would significantly undermine his political standing in Kinshasa.

🫱🏾‍🫲🏾 Summitry

EU-SA Summit held in Cape Town, 13 March

The 8th EU-South Africa summit took place in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 March. Discussions during the summit were centred around the strategic partnership (established in 2007) between South Africa and the EU, focusing on key sectors such as trade and investment, health, education and skills, macro-economic policies, environment, defence, peace and security.

South Africa is the EU’s largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, with €49 billion worth of trade in goods in 2023. The EU is also South Africa’s top source of foreign direct investment (FDI)South Africa’s FDI stocks come from the EU (47%).

A key outcome of the summit was a €4.7 billion investment package for South Africa, as part of the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, in support of the just energy transition, vaccine manufacturing, and physical connectivity infrastructure.

In a joint declaration following the summit, EU and South African leaders acknowledged challenging political and socio-economic environment, characterised by “rising geopolitical and geo-economic competition and instability, heightened conflict, deepening inequality, increasing global economic uncertainty, and fragmentation and a climate emergency.” Leaders also acknowledged their shared commitment to multilateralism, as well as “a consistent approach to the rules-based order, and the centrality of the United Nations Charter.”

The EU also expressed support for South Africa's G20 presidency, including its theme of solidarity, equality and sustainable development. This stands in contrast to increasingly strained relations between South Africa and the U.S, which have reached their lowest in recent days. In February, the Trump administration cut off aid to South Africa, citing disapproval of a land expropriation law and South Africa’s ongoing genocide case against Israel at the ICJ.

The SA-EU bilateral summit is the first of a series of key meetings between the EU and African partners in 2025, which will be followed by the 3rd EU-AU Ministerial Meeting and the 7th EU-AU Summit later this year.

🔶Diplomacy Watch

Staying with US-South Africa relations, on 14 March South Africa’s ambassador to Washington, Ebrahim Rasool, was declared persona non grata and given until 21 March to leave the U.S. In  a post on X by U.S Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said Rasool was a “race-baiting politician who hates President Donald Trump and the U.S. Rubio linked his remarks to an article by the right-wing media outlet Breitbart, which made reference to remarks made by Rasool during a webinar hosted by a South African think tank.

Essentially, Rasool characterised Trump’s foreign policy approach, under the MAGA movement, as fuelled by a supremacist instinct, that was aimed at preservation of white minority, not only in the U.S but globally. In response, the South African presidency issued a statement stating that the decision was “regrettable,” and noting that it remained committed to building a mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S.

Earlier in the week, the news outlet Semafor reported that Rasool, a veteran diplomat, had been struggling to secure meetings with officials at the US State Department and other high-level government officials in Washington. This was likely the result of his vocal anti-Israel stance and strong advocacy for the Palestinian cause.

Broadly, the development is the latest in souring relations between the U.S and South Africa. Although some analysts have perceived the expulsion as an extreme response by the U.S., the move may be wielded by Washington as an example for other would-be naysayers and detractors of Trump’s administration and his foreign policy approach. Since returning to the White House in January, the Trump 2.0 administration has displayed a remarkable predilection for coercive instruments of statecraft such as tariffs, intimidatory tactics and rhetoric in order to get its way in international relations.

South Africa’s neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, its growing ties with BRICS allies Russia and China, as well as its historical support for Palestine have grated Washington, which seems to have been gunning for any transgression to castigate Pretoria on the world stage.

Viewed differently, the incident can also be seen as an opportunity for South Africa to seize the moment in taking charge of core narratives surrounding its foreign policy, including articulating a clear vision of its national interest, principles and objectives in both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagements. Pretoria can no longer afford to simply be reactive but must embrace a more proactive style of engagement, all while remaining steadfast to the art and essence of diplomatic practice and principled statecraft.

The G7 Foreign Ministers meeting took place in Charlevoix, Quebec, (Canada), 12-14 March. A core objective of this meeting was to forge a unified statement demonstrating solidarity among the member states, including the U.S and its allies. The meeting took place against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions and adversarial actions by the Trump administration, specifically the imposition of US tariffs on steel and aluminium, which had already provoked retaliatory measures from Canada and the European Union. Despite the underlying tensions and divisions, the G7 ministers managed to issue a joint statement, echoing the familiar refrains on a range of global issues : backing Ukraine, condemning Russia, affirming Israel’s right to self defence etc. The joint statement, notwithstanding, the issues and concerns identified by Canada, with reference to Trump’s policies, indicate a fracturing of traditional alliances and growing divisions in a tumultuous geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, the frantic efforts to produce a joint decalaration can be taken as a prioritisation of optics and attempts to highlight the grouping’s relevance in a post-hegemonic world order, especially in light of ascendant groupings such as the BRICS which have demonstrated dominance across a number of indicators such as economic clout, resource wealth and global demographic representation.