Five key developments in international relations this week: 10-14 Feb 2025 🔍🌍

⚔️⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

The Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) made major advances against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its latest efforts to regain control of the greater Khartoum area. The SAF has recaptured nearly all of northern Khartoum, also known as Khartoum Bahri, from the RSF and is reported to be within 2 km of the presidential palace in central Khartoum. With the army’s latest gains, the RSF’s last line of defence is the south of the capital, which is likely to be the site of intense fighting in the coming days.

Building on its momentum on the battlefield, SAF’s Commander and the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, said during a speech on 08 February that the SAF would form a technocratic government once the capture of Khartoum had been completed. He added that the main mandate of the proposed caretaker government or wartime government, which would be composed of independent national experts, would be to resume transitional tasks and support the army in the remaining military operations “to cleanse Sudan of the Rapid Support Forces.”  

Burhan’s comments come on the back of consultations among allied national and social political forces in a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue held in Port Sudan which concluded on 08 February. A notable outcome of the consultations was the announcement of a political roadmap for the post-war phase. In addition to calling for the formational of a technocratic government, the roadmap also proposes a comprehensive national dialogue for all political and societal forces, welcoming those who denounce the RSF; and necessary amendments to the constitutional document, which would be approved by the afore-mentioned national and societal forces before selecting a civilian prime minister to lead the executive branch “without interference”.

In 2019, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the military component (the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces) signed a constitutional declaration to serve as the constitutional reference for the transitional period. However, this transition was abruptly interrupted when Burhan orchestrated a coup that installed a military junta, dissolving the transitional government, arresting ministers and politicians. A major source of disagreement between the military factions of the interim government were issues of creating a unified command and control, including a proposal to integrate the RSF into the armed forces. Tensions between the SAF and RSF escalated, fostering a power struggle that eventually culminated in the outbreak of the ongoing conflict in April 2023.  

Although the proposed 2025 political roadmap has been presented as an inclusive process, el-Burhan has asserted that the dissolved Islamist National Congress Party (NCP) and the pro-democracy Taqaddum coalition will not return to power; he has accused these groups of supporting those who "kill the Sudanese”, referring to the RSF. The roadmap also sets conditions for any negotiations with RSF, requiring the laying down their weapons, evacuation of civilian sites and ending the siege on el-Fasher. A recent fracture within Taqaddum – Sudan’s main civilian coalition – will further benefit the SAF’s claim to be the only legitimate actor in Sudan. Taqaddum members have been divided since December 2024 over an internal proposal from Darfuri members of the coalition to form a parallel government-in-exile to govern areas in RSF control, essentially most of the Darfur region.

In light of shifting military dynamics, which suggest that the tide of war has changed in favour of SAF, there are concerns about potential reprisals in areas recently recaptured by the army. These fears are substantiated by reports shared by Amnesty International of lists circulating that target activists, human rights defenders, medical and humanitarian workers accused of being "partners of the RSF.” Furthermore, the UN human rights office documented at least 18 civilian deaths in Khartoum North since the army began its advance there in late January. These reports of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and torture, particularly targeting communities suspected of RSF ties, highlight the grave risks faced by civilians in Sudan.

The conditions attached to negotiations, the fragmentation of political alliances, and the involvement of external actors all present obstacles to achieving a lasting peace. Despite calls for ceasefires and peaceful resolutions, both the SAF and RSF have continued their military offensives, a sign perhaps that both sides remain unwilling to compromise at present, presaging a prolonging of deadly conflict.

M23 rebel group resumes advances in South Kivu

The M23 rebels have resumed attacks on armed forces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo after a two-day lull in fighting. Despite declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 03 February, the rebel group attacked Congolese army positions in South Kivu, taking over two towns on the road to Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu. There was a brief lull in fighting following a joint EAC-SADC summit on 08 February which called for an immediate ceasefire and direct negotiations between President Felix Tshisekedi's government and the rebels, while urging Rwanda to withdraw its forces from eastern Congo. The joint summit also directed the chiefs of defence forces of both blocs to meet within five days to provide “technical direction on [an] immediate and unconditional ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.”

As M23 rebels prevail in their southwards advance, their next target seems to be Kavumu airport, located about 30 km from Bukavu, which is a strategic site for the FARDC’s supply lines. Bukavu has been preparing for an M23 offensive for several days, with schools shuttering and residents fleeing over fears of an imminent attack. Should the rebels take Bukavu, they would be in control of an area that covers the entire Congolese border with Rwanda and Burundi, as well as a long stretch of the border with Uganda.

Further fighting in the South Kivu province would also add to fears of a broader war due to the presence of about 10,000 Burundian troops, who are supporting the Congolese government forces against the M23 advance. Burundi's President Evariste Ndayishimiye said that his troops would defend themselves if they came under attack by the M23, who are reported to be receiving substantive military and logistical support from Rwanda.

The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is expected to hold a meeting on 14 February, ahead of the AU summit which will take place 15-16 February. Key  issues for the PSC summit include: how to institute a complete cessation of hostilities, how to de-escalate mounting regional tensions, how to build on the communiqués of the 1256th PSC ministerial session, the joint EAC-SADC Summit, and clarification of the proposed merger of the Luanda and Nairobi processes.

The DRC has called for targeted sanctions against Rwanda but with little effect. At the UN Security Council, a draft resolution was circulated to all Council members last week. Currently, Security Council members are negotiating the draft, which, among other things, demands the M23 to stop further territorial expansion and withdraw from Goma and all other controlled areas. The EU Parliament on 13 February adopted a resolution urging the EU to freeze direct budget support for Rwanda until it ceases support for the M23 armed group and allows humanitarian access into areas that have fallen under the group’s control.

Humanitarian situation update: The fighting has led to significant displacement, with over 500,000 newly displaced since the beginning of the year, adding to the 6.4 million already internally displaced people, according to the UN. In Goma, the humanitarian situation is worsening, with large parts of the city lacking running water, forcing residents to use water from Lake Kivu, where bodies have been recovered after the fighting.

Russia and U.S Agree to Ukraine Peace Talks

Russia and the U.S have initiated a new diplomatic track to end the Ukraine war, following a call between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin on 12 February. After the call, which lasted for almost an hour and a half, President Trump said they had agreed on "starting negotiations immediately" to end the war in Ukraine. Trump added that he had directed U.S officials, specifically Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to lead the negotiations.

Trump also seemed to make key concessions on Ukraine's behalf ahead of any such talks, questioning the practicality of Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership, in addition to the possibility that Ukraine could be forced to make some territorial concessions. U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth took an even firmer position, stating that the return of Ukraine to its pre-2014 borders is "an unrealistic objective." Speaking on 12 February at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group – a U.S-led initiative that brings together military backers of Ukraine – Hegseth also ruled out the deployment of US troops to guarantee Ukraine's postwar security, asserting that it is up to the Europeans to take the lead. He also stated that any future deployment of troops to Ukraine should not covered under Article 5 but rather be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission.

The move by the U.S to open Ukraine peace talks with Russia took European allies by surprise, with several European NATO diplomats raising concerns about the concessions and conditions articulated by Trump and Hegseth. There had been an expectation that the first visit of the new US administration would have been an opportunity to put out feelers and find common ground, however, Trump’s direct engagement with Russia and a seeming softening stance on Ukraine's territorial integrity and NATO membership has left European allies feeling sidelined. The emphasis on European burden-sharing highlights a continued desire from the U.S for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security.

 🔶Summitry

Munich Security Conference, 14-16 February

The annual Munich Security Conference (MSC) is taking place from 14 -16 February in Munich, Germany. President Trump's Ukraine peace plan and the situation in the Middle East will be among the top issues to be discussed. The conference will host over 60 heads of state and government, as well as around 150 defence and foreign ministers from around the world.

Top issues on the agenda

• Ukraine peace plan : A key focus will be discussions around President Trump's proposed peace plan for Ukraine. The conference aims to provide a platform for discussing the outlines and parameters of such an agreement. U.S Vice President J.D Vance is expected to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for talks that many observers, particularly in Europe, hope will shed at least some light on Trump’s ideas for a negotiated settlement to the war.

•  Middle East crisis: The conference will address the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, the political processes in Syria and the humanitarian challenges arising from ongoing violence in the region.

• Global security challenges: Discussions will encompass a range of global security challenges, including global governance, climate security, and democratic resilience.

• Global Security Dynamics: The conference will explore shifting international alliances and the transition from a U.S.-led unipolar world to a more multipolar global order. This theme is underscored in the Munich Security Report 2025 which addresses the concept of multipolarization, describing it as a shift of power toward a larger number of actors who have the ability to influence key global issues.

  The report notes that : “multipolarization engenders mixed feelings. The optimistic reading highlights opportunities for more inclusive global governance and greater constraints on Washington, long seen as too dominant a power by many. In the pessimistic reading, multipolarization increases the risk of disorder and conflict and undermines effective cooperation.”

• Transatlantic Relations: The future of NATO and transatlantic partnerships will be examined, especially in light of changing U.S. foreign policy under the new administration. Discussions are expected to address defence spending and European contributions to security efforts.

• The conference will also address conflicts in Africa and tensions in Southeast Asia.

In sum, outcomes from MSC 2025 may influence future policies regarding NATO's role in Europe, U.S.-European relations, and approaches to global governance amidst rising geopolitical tensions.

2025 AU Summit

The 38th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Summit is taking place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 12-16 February.  This year’s theme is ‘Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations,’ with a broad scope on reparatory justice, including a focus on financial reparations, land restitution and cultural preservation, among other aspects.

Another major item on the agenda at the summit is the election of the AUC's senior leadership positions, including the chairperson, deputy chairperson, and six commissioners. Three candidates are competing for the position of AU Commission Chairperson, which is designated for a representative from East Africa this election cycle: former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, and Madagascar’s former Foreign Minister Richard Randriamandrato. Odinga and Youssouf are considered frontrunners.

Odinga, who previously served as the AU High Representative for Infrastructure Development, laid out an eight-point agenda that includes economic transformation, enhancing intra-African trade, Africa's financial independence, championing gender equality, climate action, peace and security, agriculture transformation, and continental integration. Youssouf’s strengths lie in his two decades of experience as foreign minister of Djibouti, coupled with extensive knowledge of the AU and his language skills.

Due to the all-male list of candidates for the position of Chairperson, the competition for Deputy Chairperson is expected to occur between the four female candidates. Hanan Morsi of Egypt and Selma Haddadi of Algeria have emerged as front-runners.

There have been concerns raised about the quality of candidates for the elections. For instance, The High-Level Panel of Eminent Africans, which shortlisted candidates based on skills, experience, and expertise, disqualified more than 60% of candidates for not meeting the minimum threshold. The outcome of the shortlisting by the Panel showed that none of the candidates for the position of Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Mining scored the minimum score of 70%, which means that there will no election for this commissioner portfolio until the next Executive Council session.

For a candidate to win in the race for position of the Chairperson, he or she must secure two-thirds majority of the vote. The election of the Chairperson is not expected to conclude during the initial rounds of the election. Instead, it may go until the seventh round, at which point one of the two leading candidates with the few votes will be eliminated, and voting will be held on the remaining candidate.

The incoming AUC leadership is expected to deal with broadening agenda, including addressing the multifaceted challenges on the continent and implementing the various continental strategies and initiatives across various dimensions, including peace and security, socio-economic development, and governance.

Saudi Arabia will host the leaders of four Arab countries at a summit in Riyadh on 20 February to discuss President Donald Trump's shock proposal regarding Gaza. The proposal involves a U.S takeover of Gaza and the displacement of Palestinians, sparking widespread condemnation, particularly from Arab nations wary of another Nakba. The leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates will attend the summit, which will take place ahead of an Arab League meeting in Cairo on 27 February. Egypt has put forward a proposal that involves forming a national Palestinian committee to govern Gaza without Hamas involvement, international participation in reconstruction without displacing Palestinians abroad, and movement towards a two-state solution.