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  • Five key developments in international relations this week: 24-28 Feb 2025🔍🌍

Five key developments in international relations this week: 24-28 Feb 2025🔍🌍

Peace & Security

⚔️⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on 23 February broke an almost two-year long siege on the city of el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, following intense clashes with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). El-Obeid’s strategic positioning, at the intersection of several roads connecting western and southern Sudan to the capital Khartoum, is tactically advantageous for the SAF as it could potentially serve as a springboard for ground and air operations targeting RSF positions in western Sudan. On the same day, the SAF also said it had recaptured the town of el-Gitaina, located just south of the capital, which was the RSF's last stronghold in the White Nile province. The SAF’s gains on the battlefield came just as the RSF signed a charter with allied political and armed groups militias in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, a government in the territories it controls.

The move by the RSF to create a ‘Government of Peace and Unity,’ has been met with criticism and concerns about further splintering of the country and worsening instability. There are widespread fears that Sudan could morph into the ‘Libyan situation’, where the country could be divided, with two or more governing entities contesting for power.

Kenya’s hosting of the paramilitary group and President Ruto’s rumoured cosiness with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo has heightened tensions between Sudan’s government (currently based in Port Sudan) and Nairobi. The Sudanese foreign ministry described Kenya’s move as a direct attack on its sovereignty and a violation of diplomatic norms and the AU charter.

For Kenya, which is also the current chair of the EAC, its association with the RSF undermines regional mediation initiatives by enabling one of the belligerents in the conflict, risking a prolonging of the war. Kenya’s actions also tarnish its image and credibility as a regional peace broker, calling into question its proffered commitment to the AU’s principles of solidarity, sovereignty and unity. This development is also reminiscent of an earlier incident in June 2023, when SAF Commander, al-Burhan, opposed President Ruto's chairmanship of an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation committee, questioning Kenya’s neutrality and pointing to Ruto’s commercial dealings with the RSF.

On the battlefront, the SAF’s recent string of successes has been attributed in part to the use of drones, which have shaped warfront dynamics in a major way. For instance, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones have been instrumental in bolstering the SAF’s advances in areas such as Khartoum and el-Obeid. In Nyala, South Darfur, which is under RSF control, satellite images captured by Maxar imagery showed at least three drones and the construction of hangars over a five-week period between January and February. Reports from last year noted several flights from the UAE to an airport near the Sudan-Chad border, likely funnelling arms to the RSF. In el-Fasher, residents and officials have also reported the use of drones in attacks on hospitals and other strategic infrastructure sites. The increased use of  drone warfare points to the role of external actors with diverse interests and agendas, who are backing the warring factions, with significant impacts on the trajectory and broader dynamics of the conflict.

The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate as relief agencies are forced to temporarily suspend operations in localities where intense fighting has hampered operations and delivery of assistance. On 26 February, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) temporarily paused the distribution of food in Zamzam camp for displaced people  located near El Fasher in North Darfur, due to escalating violence. This, along with the freeze on USAID payments, has exacerbated an already grim situation with an estimated 24.6 million people currently facing acute hunger, per UN reports.

🛢️Energy & Geopolitics

U.S Revokes Venezuelan Oil Concessions

U.S. President Donald Trump said he plans to revoke Chevron Corp.’s oil license to operate in Venezuela, citing the electoral conditions in Venezuela and the country’s failure to take back migrants from the U.S as quickly as it promised. Per the post on Truth Social on 26 February, President Trump referred to a concession agreement from November 2022, issued under the Biden administration, which granted Chevron licence to produce and sell oil despite sanctions against the government of President Nicolás Maduro. Under the terms of the license, Chevron would have to exit Venezuela by the end of July.

The decision is illustrative of the Trump administration’s propensity to use energy restrictions as a way of forcing concessions over migration policy. Operations under the licence in question drove Venezuela’s exports to a seven-year high, enabling President Nicolas Maduro to leverage the booming economy to his political advantage. Cancellation of the licence would deal a significant blow to the lifeline of the economy and cut off a steady source of revenue for the Maduro administration. Chevron is the only major U.S. oil producer operating in Venezuela and was producing more than 200,000 barrels a day from its share of ventures in the country as of mid-2024.

Following Trump’s comments, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a post in X that he will provide “foreign policy guidance” to “terminate all Biden-era oil and gas licenses that have shamefully bankrolled the illegitimate Maduro regime.”

🧱Multilateralism

G20 Finance ministers’ meeting,  26-27 February

The first G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting (FMCBG) took place 26-27 February 2025, in Cape Town under South Africa’s Presidency of the G20. The absence of top officials from major economies like the U.S., China, India, and Japan indicates significant divisions within what was once a major multilateral forum. The meeting concluded without a consensus, leading to the release of a ‘chair's summary’ instead of a joint communiqué.

A central point of contention was climate finance, with disagreements emerging regarding the prioritisation of climate action. South Africa had hoped to use the G20 to pressure richer nations to contribute more to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries.

The meeting also addressed critical topics such as the global economic outlook, international financial architecture, sustainable finance, and international taxation. Despite the lack of consensus on other issues, participants reiterated their commitment to resisting protectionism and supported a rules-based, non-discriminatory, fair, open, inclusive, equitable, sustainable, and transparent multilateral trading system. Overall, the meeting highlights the difficulty in achieving meaningful multilateral cooperation in the face of rising geopolitical tensions and a shift towards more nationalistic priorities. The next meeting will be in April 2025 in Washington, DC.

🛡️Defence & security

Ghana receives €50 million military package from the EU

The European Union (EU) on 26 February handed over a €50 million security package to the government of Ghana, intended to bolster the country’s border security, intelligence-sharing, and counterterrorism efforts in the face of growing threats from armed groups and jihadists in West Africa. The security assistance package, which was delivered under the EU’s European Peace Facility (EPF) funding mechanism, includes civil engineering equipment, advanced communication systems and riverine assets. The latest funding builds on EU’s delivery of 105 militarized vehicles in 2023, with further defence support scheduled through 2026.

The EPF is an off-budget funding mechanism for EU actions with military and defence implications under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It has two pillars – one for military operations and one for assistance measures. The assistance measures pillar finances the military aspects of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and supports capacity building of partner countries and international organisations in military and defence matters.

The delivery of military equipment to Ghana is part of the EU’s integrated approach to respond to the deteriorating security conditions in the northern regions of the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, which combines various tools, including development assistance and support to governance, aimed at preventing and combatting violent extremism. The assistance measure is also aimed at strengthening Ghana's role in regional stability, especially in containing the spillover of insecurity from the Sahel.

Other beneficiaries of the EU’ assistance packages include Benin, Niger, Mozambique, Mali and Somalia, among others.

China flexes military might in waters near Australia and New Zealand

In recent days, the Chinese navy has conducted military exercises, including live-fire drills, in the Gulf of Tonkin near Vietnam and the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. The governments of both Australia and New Zealand complained that they had been given no notice of the drills and commercial airlines were forced to divert flights as a result.

Despite protestations from Canberra and Wellington about the military drills, the military exercises were legal and complied the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to exercises in international waters. Prior to the exercises, the PLA Navy had given notice on 21 February of its intent to conduct a possible live-fire exercise, prompting the establishment of a maritime and air exclusion zone and diversion of trans-Tasman commercial flights.

The military exercises reveal China’s power projection capabilities, the result of modernization efforts in recent years aimed at bolstering the PLA’s force generation. The exercises showcased immensely powerful naval capabilities, including a Type 055 Renhai-class cruiser, a Type 054A Jiangkai II frigate and a Type 903 Fuchi-class replenishment ship, all of which underscore China’s capability to project its military force far beyond its own shores. Although the exercises marked the first time Chinese vessels have conducted military exercises in the Tasman Sea, more of such operations can be expected as China builds closer ties with countries in the South Pacific.

China has for years insisted that its military is only for defensive purposes, however recent moves such as the development and deployment of aircraft carriers and bolstering of its shipbuilding capabilities suggest a trajectory more in line with enhancement of power projection instruments. In addition, China’s sustained aggression in the South China sea, which has seen violent confrontations with Vietnamese and Philippine vessels, has fostered militarization of the Indo-Pacific region, as these countries orient their strategies towards curbing China’s intimidation.

Relatedly, there are reports that the U.S has restored the Tinian North Field, a former WWII B-29 bomber base located 193 km northeast of Guam. The restoration, conducted between December 2023 and January 2025, includes over 20 million square feet of runway and infrastructure improvements. emphasizing dispersed, flexible basing to counter China’s missile threats. The overhaul is aimed at integrating the site into the US Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy which emphasizes dispersed, flexible basing, alongside Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and other Pacific airfields.

In case you missed it…

Israel launched a new wave of airstrikes on Syrian military sites on 25 February, following Prime Minister Netanyahu's demand for the “complete demilitarization” of southern Syria. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz described the strikes as part of a policy prevent military buildup in what Israel now calls a “security zone.” The operations targeted sites in Deraa province and areas near Damascus. After the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, Israel expanded its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights by seizing the demilitarized buffer zone, a move that violated the 1974 disengagement agreement with Syria. The extensive airstrikes and seizure of territory reflect Israel’s strategic exploitation of the security vacuum created by this transition. This aggressive posture has heightened tensions with Syria's new government, which has condemned these actions as violations of Syrian sovereignty and international agreements.