Five key developments in international relations this week: 20-24 Jan 2025 🔍🌍

⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

An oil refinery located in the north of Khartoum was the site of intense fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 21 January. The Al-Jaili refinery, located about 70 km north of the capital Khartoum , had  been seized by the RSF shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in April 2023. In recent days, the army has intensified its attacks on the refinery, attempting to wrest control of the facility and the surrounding city of Al-Jaili. According to local reports, after the confrontation between the two military factions, heavy smoke could be seen billowing from the refinery,visible across Bahri and the neighbouring city of Omdurman. The incident highlights the destruction of critical infrastructure as a key feature of the war, which in turn has cut the population off from accessing essential supplies and services such as healthcare and transportation.

Fighting was also reported in el-Fasher, North Darfur state, with tensions having escalated earlier this week after the RSF issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the SAF to leave the city. Following the expiry of the ultimatum on 23 January, the RSF launched an assault on the city using drones and artillery shelling. Since May 2024, el- Fasher has been under RSF siege, with widespread fears that it would kill civilians based on their ethnicity, as it has done in other parts of Darfur. The RSF's actions have been characterised by systematic targeting of non-Arab groups, particularly the Masalit ethnic group, raising concerns over the potential for genocide, reminiscent of the first Darfur war in 2003. The RSF’s atrocities against civilians have also included widespread sexual and gender-based violence, rape, torture and attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, including camps for internally displaced people (IDPs), hospitals, and markets.

As command of the battlefield ebbs and flows, the war is propelling the country toward further fragmentation. The overall picture is one where the military balance of forces has oscillated in both directions over the course of the fighting but neither side has been able to claim a sustained dominance militarily. There's a strong possibility of a de facto partition that roughly splits Darfur from the rest of the country. The RSF is entrenched in the western region, maintaining a hold over the Darfur region, while the SAF mostly controls the eastern and northern parts of the county. The central and southern states are actively disputed, with neither side achieving a decisive victory. As the war drags on, the perceptible faultlines have been entrenched by various economic and policy decisions taken by the belligerent parties in recent months. For instance, earlier this month, Sudan’s de facto government, which is under the control of the SAF, issued new banknotes for largest denominations of the Sudanese pound, a move that essentially fostered a currency divide in the country. In  November last year, the RSF banned exports of agricultural goods and commodities to Egypt, in an effort to sever a key source of revenue for the SAF. The export ban not only aggravated economic hardship of the population in the agricultural heartlands of Al Jazira and Sennar, but has also piled pressure on humanitarian supplies, amidst fears of worsening food insecurity.

Another emerging trend of the war is ethnicization, manifest in ethnic mobilisation and recruitment fuelled by the increased use of hate speech by both sides to delegitimise the other side and its allies. The mobilisation along ethnic lines, paired with the tendency of warring parties to make use of local armed groups as proxies has led to the emergence of complex coalitions, which could complicate efforts towards reaching a negotiated compromise. The proliferation of militia groups and armed groups, some of whom have sought to fill power vacuums across the country and position themselves a security providers, points to an increasingly fragmented conflict environment, adding to the growing risk of a reignition of micro-conflicts along ethnic lines in an already precarious context.

🚨 Conflict in the eastern DRC – M23 rebel group makes territorial gains as DRC-Rwanda peace talks falter

Fighters from the March 2023 (M23) rebel group on 21 January seized control of the town of Minova, a key supply route for provincial capital of North Kivu province, Goma. This takeover adds to the territorial gains of the M23 as it seeks to expand its presence in eastern DRC -  a mineral-rich region bordering Rwanda and Burundi. In recent week, the rebel group has captured a string of towns in South Kivu province, including Lumbishi, Numbi and Shanje, as well as the town of Bweremana in North Kivu province.

The M23 is an armed group, primarily composed of ethnic Tutsis, operating in North Kivu province in eastern DRC. The rebel group takes its name from the March 23 Agreement of 2009 when the DRC government, under President Joseph Kabila — son of Laurent-Désiré Kabila — signed a ceasefire treaty with the Tutsi-majority National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Following the failure of the integration process of former CNDP fighters into the Congolese military forces (FARDC) and a breakdown in the negotiation process with the government, aggrieved ex-CNDP combatants established the M23 in 2012 and launched a series of offensives that resulted in the capture of large swathes of territory in North Kivu province, including Goma. In 2013, following international pressure and military intervention by the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO, the M23 was defeated militarily. Many of its fighters fled to neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda. However, the group never fully disbanded. In late 2021, the M23 initiated an offensive against Congolese military forces and allied militias in November 2021. The M23 advanced rapidly in the push towards Goma and by early 2023 had nearly achieved the complete encirclement of the city.

The resurgence of the M23 has been attributed to military and operational support by Rwanda, whose own interests align with the group’s proclaimed cause of protecting Tutsi communities in eastern DRC and the neutralisation of the  Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a remnant of the Hutu extremist group that carried out the genocide against Tutsi in 1994. Independent observers, including UN experts, have indeed documented important Rwandan support for the M23, including transfers of arms and ammunition, facilitating recruitment, and even direct combat support by the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).

Tensions between Kinshasha and Kigali have escalated since the M23’s resurgence, with diplomatic relations reaching a historic low. Amidst a deteriorating security situation, belligerent rhetoric from both sides and waning commitment to a diplomatic process facilitated by Angola, has raised concerns about broader regional stability. Despite a ceasefire agreement between the DRC and Rwanda that was reached in August 2024 (as part of the Luanda process), M23 rebels resumed offensives in October 2024. Most recently, a meeting between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda scheduled for December 2024 was postponed due to the unresolved issue of negotiations with the M23. Specifically, Rwanda has insisted on opening direct negotiations with the M23, a demand that has been fiercely resisted by the DRC delegation. The latest setbacks in the negotiations point to the deep-seated mistrust and mutual politics of destabilization that not only diminish prospects for peace in the near-term, but also undermine parallel initiatives under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), respectively. While the Luanda Process seeks to address the inter-state dimension of the crises in the eastern DRC through dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda, the Nairobi Process aims to mediate a resolution between the government of DRC and various armed groups active in the eastern regions of the country.

In 2023, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed SAMIDRC, consisting of troops form Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, to assist the FARDC in fighting armed groups. SAMIDRC was envisaged to take over from the EAC Regional Force, which withdrew from eastern DRC in December 2023 upon request from Congolese authorities. The Congolese government wanted a more assertive posture but the regional force maintained that its mandate was largely defensive and complementary to the political process under the aegis of the EAC. Despite SAMIDRC’s offensive mandate, as well as operational support from MONUSCO, the mission has come up against a formidable and well-armed M23, which is reported to be in possession of sophisticated weaponry, including GPS-guided 120 mm mortar rounds, surface-to-air missiles, and jamming and spoofing systems, among others.

In addition to direct harm and violations against civilians, the  escalating violence has also resulted in mass displacement, compounding a humanitarian crisis which has already seen 7 million people displaced from their homes. According to the UN, more than 230,000 people have been displaced since the start of January 2025 alone.

As the M23’s recent advances position them within striking distance of Goma, recurring clashes with government forces has been marked by the indiscriminate use of heavy artillery, shelling and bombings in populated areas. Apart from aggravating an already dire humanitarian situation, the ongoing conflict – underpinned by a complex interplay of local and regional interests – could spill over into neighbouring countries, with significant implications for regional stability.

Houthis halt attacks on Red Sea vessels as Gaza truce takes effect

Yemen's Houthi rebels announced on 20 January a stop to missile and drone attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea, with the exception of Israel-linked ships. The group's ‘Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center’ issued a statement saying that it is lifting its yearlong blockade on shipping in the Red Sea, following implementation of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza last week. However, the group warned that the phasedown in targeted attacks was conditional on the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza and it could resume hostilities in the event that the ceasefire is breached by Israel.

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group that control most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia. The group emerged in the 1990s but rose to prominence in 2014 after their takeover of Sanaa and toppling the interim government at the time, sparking a decades-long civil war, which has drawn in a complex web of regional and international actors.

The Houthi’s political agenda and ideology, which is viciously opposed to Western imperialism and Israel’s Zionist agenda, has positioned them as a key player in regional dynamics, including integration into the Iranian-backed  ‘Axis of Resistance’ – a military network of militant groups that includes Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, opposing U.S. and Israeli interests in West Asia. Since the onset of Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis have carried out more than 100 attacks on ships, primarily through missile and drone attacks, as well as direct assaults. Initially, the attacks were targeted against ships perceived to be linked to Israel, but the scope has at times broadened. The epicentre of attacks is the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are joined by the narrow Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East – a crucial maritime passageway which accounts for 10 percent of the world’s seaborne crude flows. These attacks have led to significant disruptions in shipping via the Red Sea, resulting in  a surge in freight costs, increased risk insurance premiums and shipping delays as ships have been forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.

The development is likely to encourage a gradual return of shipping traffic via the Red Sea route in the coming weeks, however prevailing uncertainty over likelihood of a resumption of hostilities could see a prolonged adjustment period by shipping companies, possibly lasting several months.

Putin and Xi hold talks - reaffirm comprehensive, strategic partnership

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, held talks via video conference on 21 January. The key points of discussion included deepening of the strategic partnership between Russia and China, growing economic cooperation and coordination across various multilateral forums and initiatives.

Notably, both leaders emphasized that relations between the two countries are “self-sufficient, not dependent on global political factors or domestic issues”. In 2024, the China and Russia  marked 75th anniversary of  diplomatic relations, which have expanded across various spheres, including, trade, transport, agriculture and sports and educational exchanges. Trade between Russia and China expanded by 7% year on year over the first 11 months of 2024, reaching more than $220 billion. China is Russia’s top trade partner, while Russia ranks fifth among China's trading partners. The two countries have also pursued major joint energy and infrastructure projects such as the Far Eastern pipeline route,  a joint Gazprom-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) project launched in 2022 that is expected to boost Russian gas supplies to China by 10 billion cubic meters (bcm). Russia is China’s top oil supplier : in 2024, exports amounted to 108.5 million metric tons, equivalent to 2.17 million barrels per day (bpd).

The two leaders also highlighted their shared vision in playing ‘an important stabilising role in international affairs,’ through various joint efforts and policy alignment across various multilateral institutions, including the United Nations and its Security Council, the SCO, the G20 and APEC.  They expressed commitment in promoting a more just multipolar world order and  ensuring indivisible security both in the Eurasian space and globally. The two leaders also reiterated fundamental values at the core of their partnership, including mutual trust and support, good neighbourliness, equality and mutual benefit.

Overall, the engagement affirms the robust and deep ties between Russia and China, their shared perspectives on international issues, and their commitment to further cooperation amidst global uncertainties.

🔶Summitry

Davos debrief

The 2025 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) took place from 20-24 January in Davos, Switzerland. The summit, which was convened under the theme  ‘Collaboration for the Intelligent Age,’ brought together a diverse range of participants including governmental leaders, business leaders, civil society representatives, and academics.

Key public figures in attendance included U.S. President Trump (who addressed the meeting virtually);  Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, Ding Xuexiang, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China; Javier Milei, President of Argentina; Olaf Scholz, Federal Chancellor of Germany; Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament; Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa and Pedro Sánchez, Prime Minister of Spain. Heads of international organisations also took part in the meeting. These included: António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director-General of the World Trade Organisation; Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and Mark Rutte, Secretary-General of NATO. Over 1,600 business leaders, including over 900 of the world’s top CEOs also participated in the meeting.

Building on the broader efforts at elevating Africa’s agency and voice in global forum, Africa House – a dedicated space for Africa-focused discourse and actions, organised a forum under the theme ‘Africa: The Future Lives Here, Leading Generations into a New Era,' which focused on the continent's vast potential in technology, creativity, and sustainable development. The Africa House Future Forum, now in its fifth year, has sought to promote African perspectives and to create a platform for constructive dialogue and exchanges on opportunities, ideas and the key role of Africa as a constitutive actor in global politics with a stake in decision-making.

Major themes and discussions

•  Shift in Economic Policy: The forum highlighted a move away from traditional economic orthodoxy, with leaders embracing experimentation, rule-busting, and a rise in protectionism. This view was reiterated by Argentine President Javier Milei who said : “it is time to break free of the script” and that “there is something badly mistaken about the ideas that have been promoted through forums such as this one.”

• Focus on Geoeconomics : The concept of geoeconomics, where countries leverage economic power to influence international politics, was a key theme, with a call for more pragmatic approach to economic diplomacy.

• Trump's "Open for Business" Message : Donald Trump, in a virtual address, declared the US as "open for business," emphasizing deregulation and urging CEOs to manufacture in America or face tariffs.

•  Artificial Intelligence and Technology : AI transformation was a central topic, with discussions on its dual nature as both a boon and a potential threat. Leaders explored the implications of advanced AI technologies, including concerns over regulation and ethical considerations.

• Fragmented financial systems : A report from the WEF highlighted the increasing risk of a bifurcated world with separate financial systems for China/Russia versus the West, potentially leading to substantial global GDP losses.  According to the report, financial system fragmentation would reduce global GDP by up to 5%, or $5.7 trillion a year.

In summary, the 2025 WEF meeting in Davos highlighted a period of global transition, characterised by economic shifts, technological advancements and a call for innovative solutions to world challenges. Traditional economic models are being challenged, leading to a period of experimentation and uncertainty. The increasing focus on side events outside the main congress building has also reinvigorated debates about the ‘Death of Davos Man,’ on the perceived decline of globalism and growing emphasis on new forms of cooperation and new frameworks of multilateralism.

The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, are preparing to deploy a joint force of 5,000 soldiers to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel region. Niger’s defence minister, Salifou Mody, who made the announcement on 21 January, noted that the force was nearly ready and would also possess its own aerial, ground and intelligence capabilities and a coordination system. The move represents a pivotal step towards strengthening strategic autonomy through collaborative approaches, partly as a response to  the Alliance member states’ dissatisfaction with the decade-long Western security presence that has thus far failed to bring about transformational outcomes in addressing regional security threats. The latest development is also occurring in a shifting geopolitical context in the Sahel which has seen waning French influence as Sahelian states have demanded the exit of the French security forces from their territories. The Sahel region is the focal point for conflicts linked to violent extremism, representing over half of all militant Islamist activity on the continent in 2024, with fatalities nearly tripling since 2020.