Five key developments in international relations this week: 17-21 Feb 2025🔍🌍

⚔️⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

The Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) recapture of Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is imminent as the army has made rapid gains south and southeast of the city over the past few days. The SAF regained control of the northern Khartoum district, also known as Bahri, on February 17 and per reports, has surrounded RSF forces on at least three axes in central Khartoum. Control of Khartoum would be militarily and symbolically significant for the SAF as it seeks to assert its legitimacy as the sole governing authority over the Sudanese state. Linked to this, the SAF-led Sovereign Council and Cabinet approved amendments to the country’s constitutional framework on 19 February, entrenching the army’s control over governing structures and granting it greater control over key appointments and policy decisions. The latest amendments extend the transitional period by 39 months, and increase the number of Sovereign Council members from six to nine, granting the military six of those seats. The amendments also maintain the 300-member Legislative Council but keep legislative authority with the Sovereign Council and Cabinet until its formation. The amended declarations also remove any mention of the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Rapid Support Forces.

In response to its battlefield setbacks, the RSF has moved to consolidate to control over the Darfur region. Notably, the RSF and political and military entities allied to it hosted an event in the Kenyan capital on 18 February during which they announced plans to sign a political charter to establish a  parallel government to Sudan’s current ruling junta that would oversee RSF-controlled areas. The talks in Nairobi brought together key figures, including SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz El Hilu, RSF Deputy Commander Abdelrahim Dagalo, and Sudan Revolutionary Front Chairman El Hadi Idris, who also leads the newly formed opposing faction of the Taqaddum coalition.

Kenya’s hosting of the RSF meeting irked the Sudanese government, prompting it to recall its ambassador to Kenya on 21 February, in protest against what it deemed as violation of Sudan’s sovereignty and national security, and “a dangerous precedent not witnessed by the region or the continent before.” In a statement, the Sudanese foreign ministry further criticised Kenyan President William Ruto, accusing him of prioritizing commercial and personal interests over historic bilateral relations. Ruto and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo are apparently friendly with one another and Ruto is a client of the RSF’s main patron, the UAE, which likely explains why the group held its conference in Nairobi.

The UN, via a statement  by UN Secretary-General’s spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, also expressed concerns about the RSF’s formation of a parallel government, warning that it would exacerbate the fragmentation of the country and prolong the fighting between the warring factions.

Elsewhere on the battlefield, there were reports on 18 February that at least 200 people had been killed in attacks over three days by the RSF on villages in the al-Gitaina area, White Nile state. In the Darfur region, the SAF resumed bombing of  Nyala, the South Darfur state capital, on 20 February. On the same day, air raids in el Shaeiriya district  in East Darfur resulted in the death of at least 10 people. In el Fasher, North Darfur state,  the RSF renewed its heavy artillery shelling on 19 February, targeting the air defence base, the airport, and other areas. As the fight for control over el- Fasher intensifies, there has been an escalation of attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, markets and refugee camps.  Over the past three weeks, the RSF has launched repeated attacks against the Zamzam camp for displaced for displaced people, forcing humanitarian and aid groups operating in the camp to suspend their activities. The camp, which hosts about 500,000 people, has witnessed a large influx of civilians fleeing from Abu Zerega, Shagra and Saluma, worsening an already deteriorating humanitarian situation. According to UN reports, over 12 million people have been displaced as a result of the conflict in Sudan, making it the world’s worst displacement crisis.

Update Political developments **:  On 23 February, the RSF and allied groups signed a charter with allied political and armed groups to establish a “government of peace and unity,” a rival authority to the ruling military junta. According to the text of the charter, the signatories agreed that Sudan should be a "secular, democratic, non-centralized state" with a single national army that would also include various signatory armed groups.

Talks between U.S and Russian officials in Saudi Arabia

Senior US and Russian diplomats met in Riyadh on 18 February – the first high-level engagement between Washington and Moscow since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The U.S. delegation was headed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and included White House national security adviser Mike Waltz and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The Russian side was represented by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Putin's top foreign policy adviser Yuri Ushakov. The meeting yielded three concrete outcomes:

• setting up diplomatic teams aimed at improving diplomatic operations in Moscow and Washington;

• establishing high level teams to sort out the “parameters of the conflict” in Ukraine; and

• a third track to identify opportunities for economic cooperation that could develop after the Ukraine conflict is settled.

Representatives from Ukraine and Washington’s NATO allies were absent from the negotiating table, a move that fuelled concerns among European leaders that they could be sidelined from peace talks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed that his country would "never accept deals made behind our backs" and "without our involvement." The decision by the Trump administration to hold direct bilateral talks with Russia marks a significant shift in U.S foreign policy, a departure from past strategies that have been aimed at isolating Russia economically and diplomatically, instead embracing Russia’s growing profile as a pivotal actor in global politics.  

In response to the U.S’ diplomatic moves, French President Emmanuel Macron convened on 17 February an emergency meeting of European partners to coordinate their strategy. The Paris  meeting, which was attended by the leaders of Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Denmark and the U.K, concluded with no clear consensus as countries remained divided over prospects of sending troops to Ukraine. Also in attendance were NATO chief Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and EU Council President António Costa. One of the most vocal proponents for a peacekeeping mission, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer outrightly declared his intention to send soldiers to Ukraine alongside other nations if a settlement were to be found. By contrast, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said talk of boots on the ground was “premature, " while Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Warsaw was not prepared to send troops to Ukraine. The disagreements reflect a dawning realisation among Europeans of ruptures in the Trans-Atlantic alliance amid mounting pressure from the Trump administration for Europe to take on greater responsibility for its own defence and security, including upping defence spending by NATO countries to 5% of GDP, double the alliance’s current annual spending on defence.

Overall, the latest developments are illustrative of broader fundamental shifts in global politics, including a shakeup of traditional alliances and shifts in the distribution of power in the international order towards multipolarity. For the U.S, Trump has prioritised a transactional approach and economic imperatives in the conduct of his foreign policy, centred around the America First tenet, with far-reaching implications for both domestic and global arenas.

M23 expands its control over territory in North Kivu and South Kivu

The M23 has continued to advance in South Kivu on two separate axes after it seized Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, on 16 February. After capturing the town of Kamanyola, about 25 km south of Bukavu on 18 February, the rebel group continued its advance further south, towards Uvira, a strategic city on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. The Congolese armed forces have been retreating without offering significant resistance. The M23’s next target appears to be Butembo, a city of 150,000 people located about 210 km north of Goma. On the northern front, which has been relatively stable since December, M23 fighters are reportedly just 14 km from Lubero, a strategic town on the way to Butembo.

The M23’s control over key logistics and commercial hubs along Lake Kivu and along the DRC-Rwanda border comes with significant economic benefits for the rebel group and its Rwandan patron. M23 control of the Bukavu area will allow the group to tax mining activity and exports as it has done in North Kivu. Furthermore, control over the Congolese ports on Lake Kivu will provide opportunities for M23 to tax the local fishing economy and control the movement of goods and people on Lake Kivu.

The M23’S rapid advances have further exposed the FARDC’s weaknesses and ineffectiveness amid reports of Congolese soldiers in some localities fleeing and retreating without a fight. The Congolese army has been beset by poor morale, informal chains of command, and split loyalties. The FARDC’s ineffectiveness has meant that local militia groups, such as the Wazalendo, have been forced to take charge over posts that have been deserted by Congolese soldiers. There are reports that the Congolese government has asked Chad for military support to counter the M23 offensive.

On the diplomatic front, various regional efforts have stalled. The EAC and SADC regional blocs have yet to implement several recommendations from a joint summit on 08 February. The AU Peace and Security Council met to discuss the security situation in the eastern DRC on February 14 but only reaffirmed the EAC-SADC summit’s recommendations.

On 21 February, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that strongly condemned the M23 offensive in DRC and their support from Rwanda. The Council demanded that the M23 immediately cease hostilities, withdraw from all areas that it controls, “and fully reverse the establishment of illegitimate parallel administrations in the DRC territory.” France, the penholder on the DRC, authored the draft resolution. The UN also condemned the use of summary executions, sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment of children, and attacks directed at civilians.

The latest developments add to mounting concerns of a broader regional war,  as reiterated by the head of UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Bintou Keita, who noted that the M23 advance places then at “the junction of the three borders between the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi”.

🏛️Multilateralism

G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting, South Africa

The G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 20-21 February. The meeting marked the first significant gathering of the G20 under South Africa's presidency, leading up to the G20 Leaders’ Summit later this year which will be convened for the first time on African soil.

In his address, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa noted that the summit was taking place in the context of a world in the throes of the polycrisis, characterised by interconnected crises, including geopolitical tensions, rising intolerance, conflict and war, climate change, pandemics and energy and food insecurity. Additionally, President Ramaphosa reaffirmed four priorities of South Africa’s G20 Presidency: strengthening disaster resilience and response, debt sustainability for low-income countries, mobilising finance for a just energy transition, and harnessing critical minerals for inclusive growth and sustainable development.

Notably absent was U.S Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who had indicated earlier this month that he would skip the meeting due to disagreements with some of South Africa’s policy decisions, which he deemed as anti-American. The U.S was represented by its Chargé d'affaires in Pretoria, Dana Brown. In a further sign of the daylight between the two countries, U.S Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a post on X on 19 February that he would skip the G20 finance ministers’ meeting scheduled for 24-25 February due to “obligations in Washington.”

South Africa-US relations have been strained in recent months over a number of issues including land reform policies, South Africa’s case against Israel at the ICJ, and South Africa’s alignment with its BRICS allies, which include Russia and China. Despite the U.S. marked absence, International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola hailed the meeting as a success, highlighting endorsement of the country’s stated priorities under its presidency. The minister also noted the introduction of new initiatives including a review of the G20’s work, a cost of capital assessment, a broadened Compact with Africa 2.0, and a new initiative on critical minerals.

🛢️Energy & Geopolitics

Brazil set to join the OPEC+ group of oil-producing countries

The Brazilian government announced on 18 February that it would join the OPEC+ group of oil exporting nations, marking a significant step in the country's trajectory as a major oil producer. This move comes nine months ahead of Brazil hosting the United Nations' 30th Climate Change Conference (COP30) in November 2025.

Brazil received an official invitation to join OPEC+ in late 2023, but had deferred the decision to join until the approval  by National Energy Council in February 2025. Additionally, Mines and Energy Minister Alexandre Silveira said that Brazil would participate in the Charter of Cooperation, a permanent forum for OPEC and OPEC+ countries to discuss industry-related issues. However, it would not take part in the group's coordinated output caps.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has presented himself as an environmental defender, and has worked to reduce deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and to protect Indigenous rights. At the same time, Lula has suggested that new oil revenues could be used to finance a transition to green energy and support environmental initiatives, such as the Tropical Forest Forever fund aimed at protecting the Amazon Rainforest. Critics argue that Brazil's participation in OPEC+contradicts its climate commitments and its aspirations to be a leader in climate action.

Overall, the development illustrates the policy dilemmas faced by the Brazilian government in navigating the tensions between economic growth through oil and gas expansion and commitments to environmental protection and Indigenous rights.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave his annual speech on Russia’s foreign policy priorities at the State Duma on 19 February. Minister Lavrov elucidated on key priorities, which included, inter alia:

• fostering safe and favourable external conditions for the country's development, economic and technological sovereignty, and improving the well-being of Russian citizens

• transitioning towards a multipolar world order, with a focus on strengthening cooperation with the "Global Majority”, which includes like-minded partners in the Global South and Global East that share its vision of a multipolar world.

• Eurasian integration and enhanced partnership and coordination between Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and other initiatives such as China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The interlinking of development plans, connectivity and infrastructure initiatives is part of the broader vision of the Greater Eurasian Partnership

• Rallying international efforts against manifestations of neo-Nazism, Russophobia and other forms of racial and religious intolerance.