The era of geopolitical competition: implications for peacebuilding in Africa

Introduction

The changing global and geopolitical landscape, marked by a shift towards multipolarity and intensification of strategic competition, is expected to both exacerbate Africa’s security challenges and to create new opportunities. Given its geo-strategic appeal and importance in an inter-connected global order, Africa has long been the object and subject of international interventions where actors, ideas, practices and experiences have shaped and been shaped by trends across the global security terrain. One aspect that stands out in this regard is the changing pattern of foreign intervention in Africa’s security affairs, manifest in the proliferation of external actors, as well as the diversification in the scale and scope of their activities and initiatives on the continent. In practice, this has been seen in the involvement of new actors (including China, Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates), operating alongside powers such as the U.S, the European Union, and France - which share a long history of engagement with the continent.

On top of security-related interests, the motivations and imperatives of external actors involved in the continent have also been driven by political, economic and geostrategic considerations. The increased attention of foreign powers towards Africa has been informed by the continent’s increased geostrategic value in recent years, underpinned by improved economic prospects pertaining to macroeconomic conditions, sustained economic growth, abundance of natural resources and favorable trends in terms of demographics, urbanization and digitalization, among other factors.

 China

Alongside its growing economic footprint in Africa, China has been deepening its peace and security role on the continent, including via financial and troop contributions to UN multilateral peacekeeping (China is the second largest financial contributor to UN peace operations and largest troop contributor among the P5), participation in joint military exercises and exchanges with African security partners, and increased participation in mediation and peacemaking initiatives. Beijing’s growing role in Africa’s peace and security has to be viewed alongside its self-identity as a responsible great power, commensurate with its economic power and diplomatic influence in the global arena. Accordingly, peace and security constitute a core pillar of China-Africa relations within the framework of the Forum for China Africa Cooperation – the main mechanism for China’s multilateral engagement with African countries and regional institutions. In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping, pledged $100 million in military assistance to the African Union (AU) in support of programmatic areas of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including capacity-building and operationalization of the African Standby Force. Thereafter, in 2019, the first ever China-Africa Peace and Security Forum was held in Beijing, adding to the visibility of expanding initiatives under military and security cooperation. Looking ahead, China’s growing security role will have to contend with its long-standing non-interference policy and the lack of military experience, all while aiming to leverage the comparative advantages of its multi-dimensional partnership with Africa.

The United States (US)

With respect to the U.S, a defining moment for its security policy towards Africa were the 9/11 terrorist attacks which elevated the Global War on Terror as the dominant prism that informed security-related activities, including various initiatives such as counterterrorism operations, capacity-building and training for African partner countries, and provision of surveillance and logistical support capabilities. The establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008 represented a re-orientation of US strategic priorities in Africa, especially when viewed through the prism of securitization which underscores the condition of weak and failed states as the dominant threat to international stability.

Specifically, the range of pathologies associated with weak and failed states, including their potential to act as terrorist havens, the hosting of war economies, and the spread of negative externalities such as irregular migration flows and large-scale humanitarian crises have been portrayed as threats to not only regional security, but to the interests of major powers, primarily in the Global North. As part of the move to contain these threats and protect vital security interests, AFRICOM’s core objectives, which included strengthening defence capabilities of African partners, and bolstering security cooperation between the US and African states through a focus on military-to-military engagement in service of US foreign policy were largely couched in the language of containment and a focus on capacity-building in fragile settings.

The marked shift in orientation towards Africa as vital to US strategic interests, based on geostrategic and security imperatives, also corresponded with the uptake of a whole-of-government approach that aligned humanitarian and development policies much more closely with military and security thinking. Broadly, at the core of the whole-of-government approach is the security-development nexus that has been reflected in significant policy adjustments and a re-orientation of intervention practices of the Global North in response to the security threats emanating from the Global South.

For many commentators, the shift in U.S security policy in Africa – from the era of disengagement in the 1990s to the arguably oversized focus on security and military approaches in the post-9/11 era – cannot be delinked from broader geopolitical considerations, especially when it comes to shoring up the US’ energy security interests in Africa, the implementation of the GWOT and strategic moves to counter China’s growing influence across the continent. The issue of geopolitical competition with China is referenced in the new US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa which was released in August 2022. In addition to affirming the centrality of the 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) approach in its engagements in Africa, the strategy document is explicit in casting China and Russia as its main rivals on the continent in terms of influencing relations with African countries and securing access to the continent’s strategic resources.

The European Union (EU)

The European Union’s (EU) security partnership with Africa dates back to 2007 when the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was formalized, outlining peace and security as core priority issues for the EU-AU partnership, with emphasis on principles such as African ownership, dialogue and a comprehensive approach to conflict and crises. In line with shifting priorities and dynamics of the partnership, a new comprehensive EU-Africa strategy was launched in 2020 with the aim of consolidating the partnership agenda in the face of an evolving geopolitical context. The 2020 Comprehensive Strategy was seen as a reflection of the policy and institutional reform agenda within the EU that looked to inject more coherence and efficiency into the financing frameworks and structures that were concerned with its external action. Notably, one significant structural change was the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as an off-budget instrument to finance activities that have military or defence implications under the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

By replacing the African Peace Facility (APF), which was the main channel for EU financial support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the EPF was promoted as a way of optimizing the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, including provisions for supply of lethal weapons alongside training, advice and capacity-building programme. For their part, African stakeholders have been left with doubts whether the broadened scope of EU contribution would result in a reduction of funding to APSA programmes. Nonetheless, from a different vantage point, the rationale behind the EPF speaks to the EU’s intent to enhance its profile as a geopolitical actor in the era of strategic competition.

 The Persian Gulf states

Although the shared historical, cultural and economic links between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa goes back centuries, the Gulf states have deepened their security engagement on the continent in recent years, in tune with growing commercial and trade relations. The security activities of various Gulf actors have included involvement in mediation of African conflicts, acquisition of military bases and naval ports along the Red Sea coastline, and support for counterterrorism operations in the region. A case in point is the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia in facilitating the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in September 2018. Not only did this bolster the profile of Gulf states as pivotal geopolitical actors along the Red Sea, but it also underscored the geostrategic importance of the Horn of Africa in terms of foreign policy considerations and as a key factor in unfolding intra-Persian Gulf rivalries. This has been most visible in the use of the Eritrea’s Assab port by the UAE and Saudi Arabia to lend military support to their proxies fighting Houthi rebels in the Yemeni civil war. For the Gulf states, dynamics in the Horn of Africa countries provided an opportunity to advance a range of foreign policy and regional security interests, including undermining Iranian influence in the region.

Conclusion

In sum, the interplay between the geopolitical dimension and evolving dynamics of conflict raises critical question about the agency of African actors in shaping the course of Pax Africana and the effectiveness of collective security frameworks in the changing regional and global security landscape. This also calls for deeper analytical reflection on the implications of the evolving security agenda for the institutions and practices underpinning peacebuilding in Africa as a key location for the contest of ideas and practices in a multi-level and multi-actor arena.