Five key developments in international relations this week:13-17 Jan 2025🔍🌍

⚔️⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

At least 120 people were killed in a shelling attack on 13 January in an area in Omdurman, one of Khartoum’s twin cities across the Nile River. It was not immediately clear who was behind the attack – unsurprisingly, given the concentration of armed clashes in and around Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) military bases and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) positions across the capital and broader tri-city area.

Following a series of multi-pronged, counter-offensive campaigns since September to rout RSF forces out of Khartoum, Sennar, and al-Jazirah states, the SAF claimed a significant victory on 12 January with the capture of Wad Madani – the capital of Al-Jazirah state and strategic vantage point, located at the crossroads of critical supply highways linking several states. In response, RSF commander Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo vowed to launch a counterattack in due course.

With the latest turn of events, the SAF currently controls Red Sea state, Kassala, El Gedaref, North, Sennar, and about 90 per cent of the Nile River state. For its part, the RSF remains territorially dominant in five other states, a large chunk of which is in its traditional stronghold in the Darfur region. Control of Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, White Nile, and Kordofan states remains contested, with neither side achieving decisive dominance.

The recapture of Wad Madani by the SAF has been accompanied by a wave of disturbing reports highlighting widespread violations against civilians. According to local reports, the SAF operations have entailed the commission of various types of war crimes, including indiscriminate targeting of civilians by airstrikes and shelling, acts of sexual violence,  summary executions and torture of detainees. The RSF is also not absolved from violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. There is mounting evidence that the RSF and allies have committed widespread unlawful killings, including mass executions, sexual violence, targeted civilian property, and repeatedly used heavy explosive weapons in densely populated areas.

On the mediation front, which continues to display limited momentum, Turkey has put forward an offer to mediate a resolution between the Sudanese conflict parties. Turkey’s reported initiative would focus on a revised engagement format, as well as facilitating dialogue between Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, in a bid to persuade the latter to stop supporting the RSF. The Turkish overture was formally conveyed in a phone call in December 2024 between  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and head of the Sudan Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who welcomed the initiative. Buoyed by its recent success in facilitating an agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia, aimed at resolving a dispute related to a memorandum of understanding signed in early 2024 between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland, Turkey has sought to position itself as powerbroker and strategic actor in the Horn of Africa. Through the MoU, Somaliland would grant Ethiopia access to the sea via the port of Berbera in exchange for its recognition as an independent state. The MoU sparked tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, resulting in an intense diplomatic row that saw Somalia pushing for exclusion of  Ethiopian troops from the AU mission in Somalia to counter al-Shabaab. With the signing of the Turkish-mediated deal in December 2024, Ethiopia would likely withdraw from its agreement with Somaliland and instead embrace a more cooperative, and mutually-beneficial  approach (with Somalia) in its efforts to secure access to the sea. Overall, Turkey’s efforts underline its assertive foreign policy in the region, driven by a multi-faceted strategy – combining diplomatic, military and humanitarian initiatives.

Israel-Palestine conflict: Israel and Hamas agree on ceasefire deal

One of the biggest news stories this week was that Israel and Hamas had reached a ceasefire and hostage deal. The deal, announced on 15 January, was negotiated by Egyptian, U.S, and Qatari negotiators is expected to take effect on Sunday, January 19. The Israeli Security Cabinet approved the deal on 17 January and the full cabinet voted to approve on 18 January, after a lengthy meeting.

Essentially, the deal is to be implemented in three phases; details of the second and third phases still need to be negotiated. The initial phase will last six weeks, and will involve a limited prisoner exchange, the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops in Gaza and a surge of aid into the Strip. Hamas will release 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. Additionally, Israel will withdraw its forces from Gaza’s population centres to areas no more than 700 metres inside Gaza’s border with Israel. Displaced Palestinians will also be able to return to northern Gaza. Beyond the six-week mark, there remains a distinct possibility that Israel could resume its military operations in Gaza, especially if Netanyahu and his ultranationalist coalition partners opt to view the ceasefire merely as ‘pause’ to allow the Israel defence forces to regroup and refit.

After 467 days under constant bombardment and wanton destruction, the ceasefire deal is a welcome reprieve for Palestinians whose daily reality in Gaza has been darkened by death and loss. For Hamas, the deal is an affirmation of their resolve and determination in pursuit of Palestinian liberation and freedoms. Tellingly, the agreement was essentially a reworked version of an earlier ceasefire deal that had been proposed by in May by the Biden administration, a reflection of Israel’s real motives and genocidal intent by prolonging the war. The timing of the deal, just a few days before Trump’s inauguration is further proof that the U.S. had the requisite leverage to pressure Netanyahu to end the carnage but the Biden administration simply chose not to. In his remarks about the deal, and in his response to journalists afterwards, President Biden sought to take full credit. For Trump, the agreement builds on to his vaunted image as a master deal maker and rhetoric about promotion of peace as one of the priorities of his incoming administration.

Although many questions remain – such as who would administer Gaza beyond the ceasefire, and who would bear responsibility for post-war reconstruction – for now, a pause in the fighting makes a strong case for optimism, as cautious as it may be.

💱Global economy

China’s trade surplus

China recorded a surplus of USD 992 billion for 2024, a leap from the record USD 838 billion surplus in 2022, according to Chinese customs data released on 13 January. Exports in December rose 10.7% year-on-year, exceeding forecasts of 7.3%, and accelerating from a 6.7% rise in November. Imports recorded a 1.0% growth, the strongest performance since July 2024. easily beating estimates of a 1.5% drop. The main driver of rising export activity was China’s exports to the Global South – China's exports to the ASEAN region grew by 12%, compared to exports to the U.S and EU, which grew by 3.7% and 3.0 % respectively.

Economists have been quick to attribute the trade surplus and rise in exports activity to front-loading in anticipation of further tariffs from the incoming US administration – a narrative that overlooks the  manufacturing-driven strengths and strategic planning of  China’s economy and its pivot towards exporting the ‘new three’, namely electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries and solar cells. Furthermore, China has leveraged its Belt and Road initiative to buttress economic growth and deepen trade and investment with partner countries in various sectors such as infrastructure and mining.

Former U.S President John F. Kennedy summed it up best when he made the observation that : “When written in Chinese, the word "crisis" is composed of two characters – one represents danger and one represents opportunity.”

🛢️Geopolitics & Energy

Europe’s energy security and the geopolitics of the Russia-Ukraine war

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has significantly reshaped Europe's energy landscape, exposing vulnerabilities and prompting a re-evaluation of energy policies. On 01 January, Russian natural gas exports via Ukraine to several European countries halted after Kyiv refused to renew a transit deal that expired on 31 December. Ukraine’s transit network is connected to the pipeline systems of Moldova, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, and then on to Austria and Italy. After Ukraine turned off the taps, Austria, Slovakia, and Hungary, made arrangements for alternative source. Hungary will continue to receive Russian gas via the TurkStream gas pipeline, via Turkey and the Balkans. Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria had to cut off heating and hot water supplies to households.

The decision to cut off Russia's oldest gas export route to Europe – a pipeline dating back to Soviet days – brings to an end to Moscow’s dominance of the EU energy market. Balkan Stream, fed by the Turkish Stream pipeline, now remains the only source of Russian pipeline gas for Europe. It delivers gas to Romania, Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Hungary. Shortly after the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the EU made it a top priority to curb its dependence on Russian energy by buying more piped gas from Norway and liquefied natural gas  (LNG ) from Qatar and the U.S.  By 2023, EU’s imports of Russian gas had fallen to 15%, compared to 45% in 2021. Gazprom recorded a $7 billion loss in 2023 alone, its first annual loss since 1999.

In a sense, the EU’s moves to cut off Russia gas supplies – in a bid to inflict damage on a key revenue source for Moscow’s war machine – could be interpreted as a classic case of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. Europe's reliance on LNG to replace Russian pipeline flows have heightened the region's exposure to price swings and market volatility. Ukraine will lose almost $1 billion annually from Russian gas transit fees. Moreover, given how delicately balanced the global gas market is, any disruption in Qatari LNG shipments could trigger a severe economic crisis as Europe relies on it for 25% of its gas.

An additional risk factor facing Europe’s energy security is dwindling reserves. According to Gas Infrastructure Europe data, storage in 2025 is just over 70% full compared with about 86% a year ago. Gas inventories currently are 25% below last year’s peak, marking the biggest drop in seven years. Withdrawal rates have  been significantly higher than average due to harsher winter conditions, raising concerns about potential shortages.

📈Trends Analysis

Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) outlook 2025

In 2025, the  Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region faces a mix of challenges and opportunities, with key trends shaping the region's political and economic landscape.

• Political landscape

Arguably, the return of Donald Trump to the White House is one of the biggest sources of uncertainty for the region. There's concern about whether he will follow through on threats of tariffs and other actions, or adopt a more collaborative strategy. Mexico is seen as particularly vulnerable due to its extensive trade and manufacturing links with the US, any confrontation on trade could send the former’s economy into recession. Trump could also opt for aggressive approach in relations with Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, reminiscent of the maximum pressure strategy during his first administration. Trump is likely to antagonize leaders in Colombia, Brazil and Peru who he sees as weak or sympathetic to China.

Latin America will also see a record number of elections ; ten countries will elect new heads of states and legislative bodies. These include: Ecuador, Bolivia, Suriname, Chile, Honduras, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana and Belize.

• Economic outlook

The region is expected to experience a GDP growth rate of approximately  2.5%, reflecting a slight improvement from 2.2% in 2024. Average inflation in the region fell to about 3.4% last year, down from a peak of 8.2% in 2022. In 2023, Latin America received 15% of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI), driven by demand for minerals such as copper and lithium, essential for clean energy technologies. 

• Transnational organised crime

Transnational organised crime will continue to impact the LAC landscape in complex and novel ways. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, cocaine production has more than doubled over the past decade, serving as key source of income for cartels. The dynamics of cocaine trafficking are evolving, with new hubs emerging in regions like West and Central Africa. The financial implications of organized crime are substantial. Crime and violence cost the region approximately 3.4% of GDP annually, which translates to losses equivalent to 80% of public education budgets.

• Climate change

In  2024, Ecuador experienced  one of its most severe droughts in over 60 years which led to critical shortages for hydroelectric plants, forcing the government to implement rolling blackouts across the country, with power outages lasting up to 14 hours daily. Also in 2024, heavy flooding in Brazil’s southeastern region resulted in significant destruction of homes and critical infrastructure. Across the region, droughts have disrupted shipping in the Panama Canal, caused wildfires in Chile, and damaged harvest. In addition to the impact on ecosystems and economies, climate change also poses a major risk to the region’s agricultural productivity, which in turn could affect global food systems. LAC is the world’s leading net food exporter – food exports reached a record high of $349 billion dollars in 2022.

In recent media engagements, President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have sought to recast their foreign policy record and legacy as the administration comes to an end. In a speech at the State Department, Biden claimed that the U.S. is leaving the world in a stronger position than it was four years ago, citing enhanced partnerships, especially within NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. The hard truth is that no amount of pontification or whitewashing can hide away the U.S complicity in supporting Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza or the direction of close to $175 billion of aid and military assistance to Ukraine, in support of a proxy war that the U.S sees as a means to ensure the strategic defeat of Russia.