Five key developments in international relations this week: 06-10 Jan 2025 🔍🌍

🚨Testing testing is this thing still on?🚨Dear readers, after a year and a half away from the keyboard (and maybe a few too many global crises), I’m back to the share my analysis and insights on the rapidly evolving landscape of global politics. #Comeback #Guesswho’sback

Also a bit of a life update, in the time I’ve been away I officially graduated with a PhD (International Relations) and changed jobs. Suffice it to say, it’s a different chapter in my professional journey 🎊

 With no further ado, let’s get right to business!

Peace & Security

⚔️SITREP : Sudan conflict

As the conflict in Sudan, which began in April 2023, drags on, the prospects of peace appear dim. It is estimated that more than 100,000 people have been killed since the onset of the war, and over 11 million have been displaced from their homes – a grim picture of what the UN and other international aid agencies have labelled as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. In addition to the violence on the battlefronts across various localities, mass atrocities are also being perpetrated by the warring military factions, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as per reports of widespread sexual violence, large-scale violations of human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), many of which amount to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. More than 24.6 million people – half of Sudan’s population – are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity at phase 5 (‘Famine’), the highest level of food insecurity according to IPC’s Famine Review Committee (FRC) classification system.

On the battlefield, the epicentre of the fighting has revolved around the capital Khartoum and the neighbouring cities of Bahri and Omdurman. However, for most of 2024, the conflict increasingly shifted toward neighbouring al-Jazirah state, a geostrategic locality with main roads feeding into the Darfur region, which constitutes the RSF’s key stronghold. Since September 2024, the SAF has launched offensive operations to oust RSF troops from Khartoum, Sennar, and al-Jazirah states. In November, the SAF managed to score some successes, including the recapture of Sennar state’s capital, Sinja, and lifting a long-running siege on two military bases in Bahri and Khartoum.

The SAF’s multi-pronged military advances in the states of  Khartoum and North Darfur, in addition to offensives in Blue Nile state, have broadly been aimed at mounting pressure on RSF troops and stretching the RSF’s military and logistical capacity. For its  part, the RSF and its allied Arab militias continue maintain control of four out of five Darfur states, with the exception of the North Darfur capital of El-Fasher, which has remained a major site of military confrontations.

Apart from the main conflict parties, ethnic militias and armed groups have also emerged as pivotal actors in the conflict, illustrating deep-seated grievances and tensions along ethnic, religious and political faultlines. In Darfur region, Arab ethnic groups allied with the RSF have launched a series of systematic attacks against non-Arab tribes such as the Masalit, including acts of violence such as mass killings, sexual violence and forcefully expelling populations from their homelands. These acts of violence effectively amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes, and bear all the hallmarks of a genocide in the making, as asserted by the HRW in its 218-page report released in mid-2024, detailing targeted attacks by the RSF against the Masalit in El Geneina, West Darfur since the onset of the war.

The targeted attacks by the RSF and allied Arab militias on non-Arab communities has driven the rise of local militias as a form of communal self-defence, with recruitment being conducted along ethnic lines. The prevalence of ethnic-fuelled violence, alongside the intent to commit genocide and ethnic cleansing by some actors, has sparked fears of fragmentation, which in turn could lead to prolonging of conflict and instability.

Adding to complexity of on-the-ground dynamics, the conflict in Sudan has also seen involvement by of external actors, who have provided military, financial and diplomatic support to the core belligerents.  These actors, which include countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, Chad, China and South Sudan speak to  not only the diversity of interests and imperatives at play, but the manner in which foreign interference has complicated efforts to bring an end to the fighting. For instance, Egypt has a long history of meddling in Sudan, harking back to its support in the fight against Islamist in the 1990s. In the current conflict, Egypt’s support for the SAF is linked to Cairo’s own designs to preserve regional influence while also stave off instability close to its southern borders. For Ethiopia, the instability in Sudan could exacerbate tensions over  long-standing border disputes with Sudan, especially in the fertile el-Fashaga region, which broader implications for regional stability in the long-term.

The conflict in Sudan has also increasingly shaped up as a theatre for geopolitical rivalry among Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE, whose interests range from economic imperatives to geostrategic calculations. Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent regional competitors such as Iran and Turkey from establishing a foothold in Sudan. Furthermore, Riyadh has sought to advance soft-power initiatives by playing a key role in mediation. Riyadh has hosted a several round of talks between the Sudanese warring factions in Jeddah since the onset of the war. More recently, Saudi Arabia co-hosted, alongside Switzerland, US-led talks in Geneva on 14 August 2024 aimed at negotiating a ceasefire and improving humanitarian access in Sudan. Although the talks failed to deliver a ceasefire, the efforts underscored the potential peacemaker role of Saudi Arabia as key actor with significant leverage.

The UAE’s role in Sudan has largely been motivated by economic imperatives, in light of its major stakes in gold smuggling trade, facilitated by the RSF. Although Abu Dhabi denies it, there is ample evidence of extensive military support to the RSF. There are also reports of the UAE covertly providing weapons to the RSF under the guise of humanitarian aid, as well as UAE-manufactured armoured vehicles outfitted with French-designed defence systems. Additionally, the UAE’s multi-billion dollar investment plans to development of port infrastructure and agricultural holdings in Sudan illustrative the high-stakes nature of its involvement in the conflict.

For its part, Iran has reportedly been supplying the SAF with armed drones, which have  bolstering the army’s airpower capabilities and lent it an upper hand in conduct of air strikes against RSF positions. From Tehran’s viewpoint, a presence in Sudan would advance its geostrategic interests including asserting greater influence and control over the Red Sea.

Russian private military contractor, the Wagner group, has been active in Sudan since 2017. Its former head, Yevgeny Prigozhin had secured lucrative gold mining concessions in exchange for arms. Moscow also established close ties with the SAF with a view to securing rights for a naval base at Port Sudan. Moreover, Sudan has also become a proxy battleground for the Russia-Ukraine war, with reports of Ukrainian special forces targeting Russian operatives  during 2024.

On the diplomatic front, peace initiatives undertaken by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the African Union have thus far achieved no meaningful outcome. A major obstacle has been SAF’s stated preconditions, specifically the demand for the withdrawal of the RSF from all territories it controls and the full implementation of the Jeddah Agreement. Such intransigence has not only informed the SAF’s glaring absence from the Geneva talks, but also its categorical objection to acknowledging the legitimacy of the RSF in any capacity as a negotiating party. For its part, the RSF has translated territorial dominance into political capital, leveraging its quest for recognition as a legitimate international player, as a main bargaining chip in negotiations. The result has been a zero-sum game of dominance as both parties seek to pursue military victory as the ultimate prize. 

Further dimming the prospects for peace have been the proliferation of parallel mediation initiatives. These include the Jeddah process (co-led by Saudi-Arabia and the U.S), the AU Expanded Mechanism, the IGAD initiative, as well as a range of initiatives by regional actors such Egypt and the UAE. The presence of multiple mediation platforms has led to forum-shopping by warring parties, complicating the peace process as they leverage different initiatives for tactical advantages.

Another major shortcoming of mediation attempts has been the failure to include civilian groups and other key armed groups. In fact, this underlines the extent to which polarization has been an impediment across various actor categories, including civic forces who themselves have displayed sharp ideological differences and incompatible visions.

As the war drags on, reports further point to intensification of violence as both parties remain adamant in their quest for military superiority, and ultimately victory. Meanwhile, the mounting death toll and wanton destruction continue to prolong suffering, despair and catastrophe for the people of Sudan.

 🪖Somalia – deployment of African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)

 The deployment of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) officially began on 01 January 2025, following the United Nations Security Council's approval of Resolution 2767 on 27 December 2024. This mission replaces the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which concluded its mandate on 31 December 2024.

Broadly, AUSSOM is mandated to focus on three core tasks:

 i. support the Federal Government of Somalia to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL/ Da’esh, prioritise the protection of civilians in Somalia and protect AU and UN personnel

 ii. support further stabilisation in Somalia and enable state-building priorities, including through capacity building of the Somali security sector;

 iii. contribute, in close coordination with humanitarian actors, to the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

The mission is authorised to deploy up to 12,626 uniformed personnel, including 1,040 police personnel and is expected to draw on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted by the AU PSC on 01 August 2024 which outlined a phased implementation and handover of security responsibilities from ATMIS, a clearly defined exit strategy with benchmarks to measure progress throughout the mission's lifecycle (with envisaged mission exit in 2029, subject to regular, joint technical assessments and updates), the importance of coordination between the FGS, the United Nations, African Union, and Somalia’s international partners to ensure capacity building and security sector the importance of coordination between the FGS, the United Nations, African Union, and Somalia’s international partners to ensure capacity building and security sector ), emphasis on coordination between the Federal Somali authorities, UN, AU and Somalia’s international partners to ensure capacity building and security sector.

Notably, AUSSOM was also envisaged as the first test case of the UNSC Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations using UN-assessed contributions. The funding model under Resolution 2719 (adopted in 2023) envisages 75% of the AUSSOM budget being funded through these contributions, while the remaining 25% would be mobilized by the AU and other partners as extrabudgetary resources. Linked to this, a Joint UN-AU team visited Somalia from 24 September - 01 October 2024 to undertake the necessary consultations with the Somali stakeholders, ATMIS troop-contributing countries, and international partners. This mission covered all the various work streams beyond financing including mission design, command and control, mission support, human rights compliance and protection of civilians. Following the visit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres submitted an AU-UN joint report to Council members on 26 November 2024, which made a strong case for “hybrid” implementation of resolution 2719 in Somalia.

While there has been broad agreement among Council members on the deployment of AUSSOM, members have had diverging views regarding how the mission should be financed. Specifically, the U.S. has had reservations about employing the 2719 framework for Somalia, considering it a premature application. It apparently produced a non-paper arguing that the milestones in the AU-UN joint roadmap for implementing resolution 2719 are not expected to be completed before mid-2025. As a result, the U.S. proposed a two-year bridging mechanism to allow additional time to finalise the framework and address budgetary and logistical challenges.

In the end, the resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (the U.S). While the issue of financing still remains a contentious issue, the deployment of AUSSOM represents progress and a crucial step towards ensuring the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations.

Indonesia becomes full member of BRICS

On 06 January, Indonesia was admitted as a full member of the BRICS bloc of countries, making it the first nation from Southeast Asia to join the grouping. The decision to admit Indonesia was made by consensus among BRICS member states and follows an endorsement of its candidacy during the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August 2023.

The BRICS grouping, named after its core members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – has undergone a round of expansion that was endorsed at the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg. Last year, it absorbed Saudi Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while bringing 13 other nations on board as “partner countries.” ( Despite a formal invitation to join the grouping, Saudi Arabia’s membership is still under consideration as the monarchy is yet to formally confirm its full alignment with BRICS).

Indonesia's membership in BRICS is seen as a strategic move to enhance its economic prospects,  including President Prabowo Subianto’s ambitious target of achieving 8% GDP growth—a goal that would place Indonesia among the world’s fastest-growing economies. Indonesia’s membership is also in line with its foreign policy outlook and a shared vision of promoting reform of global governance and enhancing cooperation among countries of the Global South. Indeed, Indonesia played a key role in the founding of the Non-Aligned movement of the 1960s and was the host of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which laid the principles for the anti-colonial movement in the 1950s and ‘60s.

In addition to bolstering its economic potential, Indonesia’s participation in BRICS will also enhance the groupings economic and geopolitical profile. The country is the world’s largest producer of nickel – accounting for over  42% of global nickel reserves.  This endowment, paired with processes underway of beneficiation and a ban on raw nickel exports, positions Indonesia as a critical player in the global supply chain for electric vehicle batteries and other modern technologies, which are essential for the energy transition. Furthermore, as the largest economy in Southeast Asia, 10^th largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. and world’s fourth most populous nation, Indonesia is well-positioned to champion the interests of the Global South and to promote global policies that support sustainable growth, fair trade practices, and access to technology, among other issues.

Indonesia's entry into BRICS strengthens the bloc's economic clout, boosts its global GDP share, and enhances its demographic profile through its large population and youthful workforce. By leveraging these advantages, Indonesia not only advances its national interests but also contributes significantly to shaping BRICS as a leading coalition of emerging economies on the world stage.

Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi’s African tour

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently concluded a significant four-nation tour of Africa, visiting Namibia, the Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria from 06 January  to 09 January  2025. Wang’s visit to the continent marks the 35th consecutive year that a Chinese foreign minister makes Africa the first overseas trip of the new year.  Over the years, the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs appears to place considerable emphasis on geographical diversity and a balance of smaller and larger states.

Key highlights from the tour:

Deepening bilateral cooperation with strategic partners: The stop-over in Namibia underscores the country’s significance as major maritime partner on Africa’s Atlantic seaboard, in addition to China's vast investment in Namibia's mining sector through projects such as the Rössing uranium mine, located in the Namib Desert near the town of Arandis. Namibia’s participation in the BRI initiative is crucial to boosting its economic development via investment in infrastructure development as well as the potential growth of its mining sector, which contributes over 14.4 % to GDP, as per figures from 2023.

Military aid Commitment: During his visit to Nigeria, Wang Yi pledged military aid amounting to one billion yuan (approximately $136 million) and announced plans to train 6,000 troops and 1,000 police officers across Africa. He emphasized China's support for African nations in addressing their own issues through homegrown solutions.

Continuity of multilateral engagements: Wang Yi’s visit to the Republic of Congo is significant mainly because the country is slated to co-chair of the next Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) gathering that will take place in the central African country in 2027.

Security as a major strategic issue: Wang Yi’s visit to Chad coincided with an attack by armed assailants on the presidential complex on 08 January. The incident took place against the backdrop of a shifting geopolitical context in the Sahel which has seen waning French influence as Sahelian states have demanded the exit of the French security forces from their territories. In late November 2024, within hours of each other, Senegal and Chad announced the departure of French soldiers from their soil and an effective end to their defence cooperation agreement with France. Most recently, at the end of 2024, Ivory Coast’s President Alassane Ouattara announced the end of defence cooperation with France and the exit of French military personnel. (#FREXIT)

For many China observers and geopolitical analysts, the steadfastness of Wang Yi’s visits not only underscores the continued prioritization of personalised diplomacy in China’s engagement with African partners, but also stands in stark contrast to the prevailing optic of an arguably disengaged Western diplomatic presence that stubbornly clings to viewing Africa through the prism of geopolitical competition.

🧪Watchlist

Key trends to watch in 2025

• Geoeconomics

The trends in energy transition and demand for renewables and green technology are poised to significantly reshape the mining sector in African countries, who are keen to leverage global demand for critical minerals.

Africa possesses approximately 30% of the world's mineral reserves, making it a vital player in supplying critical minerals necessary for achieving global net-zero emissions by 2050. According to UNCTAD, Africa is home to significant reserves of critical energy transition minerals such as 55% of cobalt, 47.65% of manganese, 21.6% of natural graphite, 5.9% of copper, 5.6% of nickel, 1% of lithium, and 0.6% of iron ore globally. Africa’s mineral wealth, if leveraged appropriately, can also serve as major engine for economic growth and development, and  a boost for trade  and industrialization in the long term.

 With mining activity for green minerals is set to grow by 600% to satisfy global demand, Africa can harness the benefits of its mineral resources by enhancing mining beneficiation and nurturing local value chains, investing in infrastructure, and adopting sustainable practices as of enhancing attractiveness to investors.

Although there have been efforts to modernise Africa’s mineral regulation frameworks, through initiatives such the Africa Mining Vision, mineral regulations still remain fragmented on the continent. Other challenges that could undermine Africa’s comparative advantage in mining include weak governance structures and inadequate regulatory frameworks, infrastructure deficiencies, skills gaps, environmental concerns, and global competition.

• Peace and security landscape

 In the peace and security landscape, a key trend to watch is a surge in conflicts on the continent, attributed to multi-dimensional causes and drivers ranging from weak governance and stalled political transitions underpinned by contests over power and resources, to resurgent violent extremism and the jihadist threat in areas such as the Sahel.  According to data collected by Uppsala University in Sweden and analysed by Norway’s Peace Research Institute Oslo, in 2024 alone, there were 28 state-based conflicts across 16 countries marking a significant rise compared to previous decades. Aside from the intensification of conflict in terms of scale and space, conflict situations have also been increasingly characterised by complexity and intractability, with implications for prospects of conflict resolutions and capacity of humanitarian action.

The surge in conflicts also has implications for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) agenda particularly in light of the notable rise in civilian deaths and casualties. In situations of armed conflict, harm to civilians has been acute as a result of deliberate targeting by belligerents, especially in instances where fighting has taken place in densely populated areas or in urban localities. Additionally, the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects has also contributed to the escalation of civilian casualties – a grim fact that has become a feature of several conflict situations  not in Africa (Sudan, the DRC,) but also in Gaza and Myanmar. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report on Protection of civilians in armed conflict published in May 2024, there were at least 33,443 civilian deaths in armed conflicts in 2023, a 72 per cent increase as compared with 2022.

The intensity and human cost of conflicts have also placed a heavy demand on humanitarian actors, who are also faced with a persistent gap in funding in the face of growing demand for action across several contexts. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2024 mid-year update, only about 18% of the required $48.7 billion for humanitarian assistance had been received by mid-year, amounting to approximately $9 billion. This shortfall in funding has also been compounded by cuts or suspension in development assistance by donor governments. One of the UN’s largest donors, Germany, trimmed off $500 million in funding for humanitarian aid from 2023 to 2024 as part of broader budgetary cuts. The UK and Canada also decreased their humanitarian aid budgets by 16% and 24 % respectively. With trends in funding pointing to a narrowing of the donor base, compounded by growing demand from protracted crises, humanitarian actors continue to face significant challenges while striving to deliver aid to vulnerable populations. 

In case you missed it…

Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda are at the forefront in terms of African states’ commitment to the AU, driven by strong ratification rates, timely financial contributions, and hosting of AU bodies. This is according to the inaugural Basic Index of State Commitment to the African Union(BASIC Index), based on finding from research conducted by Integrate Africa Advisory Services and Africa First Advisory. The index evaluates state commitment using five key indicators : ratification of AU treaties, timely fulfilment of financial contribution commitment to the AU regular budget, hosting of AU bodies, the level of attendance at AU summits, and visa openness to citizens of other AU member states.